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We’re pleased to begin this issue with a summary of the past year’sUnited States Supreme Court civil cases, written by Professor ToddPettys, the Associate Dean for Faculty and the H. Blair and Joan V.
White Chair in Civil Litigation at the University of Iowa College of Law.
Professor Pettys will now be doing an annual survey of these cases for Court
Review, joining Professor Chuck Weisselberg of Berkeley Law, who has done
the criminal cases for us for the past five years.
It has taken us awhile to get replacements for our old friend, Professor
Charley Whitebread, who had done the summaries for us for more than 20
years before his death in 2008. This is a Court Review feature that many of our
judges rely upon to make sure that they haven’t missed any important devel-
opments each year. We are thrilled to have two outstanding scholars and teach-
ers now on board to prepare these summaries
exclusively for us, focusing on the cases most
of interest to judges in the state courts.
For any of you who haven’t provided your
email addresses to the American Judges
Association, you should know that we recently
began a practice of first posting these timely
summaries electronically—and notifying AJA
members by email—as soon as they are ready.
Professor Weisselberg’s summary of the crimi-
nal cases was sent to AJA members September
10, and Professor Pettys’ summary of the crim-
inal cases came out electronically on December
7. To be included next year when these sum-
maries are first available—and for other timely
articles that may first be posted electronically—be sure to give the AJA your
email address. You can send it by email to aja@ncsc.dni.us. 
This issue has three more articles that we think you’ll find of interest. 
First, a group of researchers looks at the effects of jury service on confidence
in the jury system, in state and local judges, and in the United States Supreme
Court. About a million people serve on juries each year in the United States,
so the impact could be significant. The researchers looked at people sum-
moned for jury service in King County, Washington, and they found that there
was a statistically significant improvement in their opinions of the jury system
and of state and local judges several months after their jury service. But there
was no difference in their opinion of the United States Supreme Court.
Second, Virginia law professor Brandon Garrett summarizes some of the key
conclusions from his study of the full record in the first 250 cases of exonera-
tions from DNA evidence. He’s written a good book (Convicting the Innocent:
Where Criminal Prosecutions Go Wrong) fully setting out his findings. We asked
him to do a shorter piece for us, and he provided a very engaging and readable
article that speaks to how judges might benefit from the lessons that can be
learned from 250 exoneration cases.
Last, we have the student essay winner from this year’s AJA competition for
law students. Sang Jee Park, a recent graduate of the University of Iowa College
of Law, reviews the caselaw on the constitutionality of mandatory pretrial DNA
testing of those arrested or indicted for a felony offense.—Steve Leben
Court Review, the quarterly journal of the American
Judges Association, invites the submission of unsolicited,
original articles, essays, and book reviews.  Court Review
seeks to provide practical, useful information to the work-
ing judges of the United States and Canada.  In each issue,
we hope to provide information that will be of use to
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The American Judges Association Executive Committeerecently had its first meeting for 2013. This is where a lotof the hard work for our organization takes place, and this
meeting was a huge success in furthering our mission of serv-
ing as the Voice of the Judiciary® and in Making Better Judges.
I want to take this opportunity to introduce and highlight your
executive committee members.
President-Elect Judge Elliott Zide is a trial judge from
Massachusetts. He and his wife, Dr. Michelle Zide, a college
professor, are the parents of three daughters and three grand-
daughters. World travelers, they just returned from Africa;
they enjoy spending time at their country home in Vermont. 
Vice President Judge Brian MacKenzie is a dis-
trict judge from Michigan, and he and his wife
are both active in national court-related organi-
zations. They have been on an adventure in
Thailand to celebrate her special birthday. 
Secretary Judge John Conery of Louisiana was
just sworn in as an appeals-court judge after
serving as a trial judge for 18 years. He has
served as President of the Louisiana District
Judges Association and as Chair of the Capital
Crimes Benchbook Committee. Together, he and
his wife, Brooksie, have five children and nine
grandchildren. 
Longtime Treasurer Judge Harold Froehlich
just retired as a trial judge in Wisconsin. He continues to serve
by appointment, but finds time to live part-time in Florida with
his wife. Following in his footsteps, Harold’s son was recently
elected to the bench. Harold is a big-time Packers fan. 
Immediate Past President Kevin Burke is a trial judge from
Minnesota, as is his wife, Judge Susan Burke. He is a nation-
ally known writer and teacher to the judiciary. The apple of
their eye—and their boss—is their nine-year-old daughter,
Kate. 
At Large Executive Committee Member Judge Elizabeth
Hines is a trial judge from Ann Arbor, Michigan, who is nation-
ally known as a domestic-violence expert. She and her hus-
band, Rusty (who is active in the American Judges
Foundation), are the parents of one daughter, a young lawyer,
who recently was married.
Executive Committee Member Judge Paul deMahy has
served since 1986 on a rural general-jurisdiction trial court in
South Louisiana. Paul and his wife, Marilyn, have raised five
children in St. Martinville and now have 14 grandchildren. He
is active in Kiwanis and the Knights of Columbus. 
Executive Committee Member Justice Russell Otter has
been a judge in the Ontario Court of Justice since 1993, pre-
siding over family, criminal, and youth cases in Toronto,
Ontario. He has been Executive Director of the Canadian
Association of Provincial Court Judges for ten years. For over
40 years, he has been a volunteer fitness instructor for the
YMCA. Russ is thrilled to be the Canadian member of the AJA
Executive Committee, and he deeply appreciates how the AJA
has embraced its Canadian members. Most of all, he is happi-
est with his three gorgeous grandchildren, two boys and a girl. 
Judge John Williams has been a municipal judge in Kansas
City, Missouri, since 1995; he has served the court as its pre-
siding judge and created its mental-health court. John and his
wife, Molly, an attorney and teacher, are the parents of a beau-
tiful 14-year-old daughter, Natalie, who has been attending AJA
conferences since she was born. 
Thank you so much for allowing me to serve as your
President. I joined AJA in 1997, and it has really made a differ-
ence in my judicial life. I served on the district
court as a family-court judge for 14 years, before
being elected to the Court of Appeal in 2010,
where I currently serve. As former President of
the Louisiana Council of Family and Juvenile
Court Judges, I also served as President of the
American Judges Foundation. My husband, Leo,
a former judge, and I are parents of four grown
children, three of whom are attorneys, and we are
the grandparents of six. Currently I am serving
as Chairman of the Uniform Rules for Family
Courts Committee, developing rules to make it
simpler to practice law in all family courts of the
state. My joy in life is spending time with my
family. I am also a big sports fan. 
Our first order of business was finalizing our midyear meet-
ing, which will be held May 2-4 in Orlando at the Wyndham
Lake Buena Vista. It will be an opportunity for excellent judi-
cial education, for sharing conversations with our colleagues
from the U.S. and Canada, and for collaborating with the
Florida Judiciary. Bring your families.
Really exciting is our annual fall conference September 22-
27 at the Fairmont Orchid on the Kohala Coast in Hawaii.  We
believe your Education Committee has developed a premier
program for us. The educational program will include ses-
sions with national experts on sentencing, including evidence-
based sentencing; dealing with drunk/drugged driving and
sobriety courts; electronic discovery/evidence implications;
domestic-violence innovations including the area of LGBT;
juvenile courts; technology in the courtroom; high-profile
cases and the media; and the U.S. Supreme Court review by
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky. In addition, professionalism
and ethics will round out the program. 
One of the exciting developments is the new format that is
being offered to take advantage of the educational offerings, as
well as the locale. On Tuesday and Wednesday, the hours will
be from 7:30 a.m. until 1:00 p.m.—the same maximum num-
ber of hours we’ve always had but starting earlier so that the
rest of the day can be used to experience Hawaii. Hope to see
you on the Big Island in Hawaii!
President’s Column
Toni M. Higginbotham
Footnotes 
1. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a).
2. Id. § 5000A(b); see also id. § 5000A(e) (exempting several classes
of individuals).
3. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
4. Id. at 2586 (Roberts, C.J.).
We begin with a dilemma.  Is there any corner of theAmerican legal landscape in which readers have notalready received word of the Supreme Court’s mon-
umental healthcare ruling in National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius?  Then again, can one imagine any retro-
spective on the Court’s 2011-2012 Term that does not make
that ruling its headline?  We will start by unapologetically giv-
ing NFIB its due, taking a broad view of the ruling’s key ele-
ments and of the future battlegrounds to which the ruling
points.  We then will turn to many of the Term’s other civil
cases, focusing particularly on decisions that are likely to be of
broad interest to those who work or litigate in the nation’s state
and federal courtrooms.  Those rulings address important
issues in the areas of administrative law, arbitration, Bivens
actions, due process, equal protection, federal jurisdiction,
qualified immunity, religion, speech, the Supremacy Clause,
and more.
THE HEALTHCARE RULING:  COMMERCE, TAXES, AND
SPENDING
In the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
Congress’s central purpose was to bring the nation closer to
universal healthcare coverage.  In the litigation that was imme-
diately launched against the legislation, two provisions were
primarily at issue.  First, Congress imposed what became
known as the “individual mandate,” stating that, beginning in
2014, many Americans would be required to carry “minimum
essential [health insurance] coverage.”1 Unless they fell
within an exempted segment of the population, those who
failed to carry such insurance would be required to pay a
“penalty,” or a “shared responsibility payment,” to the Internal
Revenue Service when filing their annual taxes.2 Second, to
help provide healthcare for many who could not afford to buy
insurance, Congress adopted a plan to expand the Medicaid
program to cover Americans whose incomes placed them
below 133 percent of the federal poverty line.  The federal gov-
ernment ultimately would pay 90 percent of the costs of that
expansion, but the states would cover the rest.  States that
refused to participate faced powerful repercussions: they could
lose all of their federal Medicaid funds.  Joined by numerous
organizations and individuals, roughly half of the nation’s
states sued, arguing that the individual mandate and the threat
to states’ Medicaid funding exceeded Congress’s enumerated
powers.  The Court took up those matters in NFIB,3 one of the
most closely watched cases in the nation’s history.
THE COMMERCE POWER AND THE MANDATE
Opponents of the individual mandate famously insisted
that, if the mandate were held valid, then Congress could dic-
tate all kinds of purchasing decisions, right down to the food
we buy at the grocery store.  At times, that argument had the
feel of a substantive-due-process claim, drawing some of its
rhetorical power from the implied premise that there is a realm
of personal decision making that no government can invade.
Rather than cast their legal arguments in those controversial
terms, however, the Act’s challengers urged the Court to draw
an activity/inactivity distinction under the Commerce Clause,
the enumerated power upon which Congress had most vocally
relied when adopting the mandate.  The mandate’s opponents
argued that the Commerce Clause empowers Congress to reg-
ulate the economic activities of those who have already entered
a given market, but does not empower Congress to force peo-
ple to enter a market in which they do not wish to participate.
Four Justices rejected that argument, finding the mandate
easily sustainable under conventional Commerce Clause
analysis.  Writing for herself and Justices Breyer, Sotomayor,
and Kagan, Justice Ginsburg pointed out that most uninsured
Americans actively seek healthcare each year—imposing bil-
lions of dollars in costs on the healthcare system—and that
nearly all uninsured Americans will require healthcare at some
point in their lives.  States cannot sustainably address the
resulting economic challenges on their own, she said, because
any state that unilaterally moves toward a system of universal
coverage will become a financially strained magnet for eco-
nomically disadvantaged individuals.  Under those circum-
stances, Justice Ginsburg concluded, the Commerce Clause
gave Congress ample power to require many Americans to
carry health insurance.
The Court’s other five Justices, however, embraced the pro-
posed activity/inactivity distinction.  Writing only for himself,
Chief Justice Roberts stated that the power to “regulate” inter-
state commerce is not the power to “create” interstate com-
merce.4 He found it unimaginable that the Framers would
have authorized Congress to force people to buy goods or ser-
vices from private sellers.  The Chief Justice believed that
allowing Congress to wield such a power would “fundamen-
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5. Id. at 2589 (Roberts, C.J.).
6. Id. at 2588 (Roberts, C.J.).
7. Id. at 2591 (Roberts, C.J.).
8. He rejected the federal government’s arguments under the
Necessary and Proper Clause for substantially the same reasons.
9. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992) (joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., reaf-
firming a right to abortion); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958)
(jointly and unanimously declaring that state officials are obliged
to abide by the Supreme Court’s interpretations of the
Constitution).
10. 132 S. Ct. at 2644 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dis-
senting).
11. Id. at 2648 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
12. Id. at 2643 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
13. Id. at 2676-77 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissent-
ing).
14. That may have been the result of a short-term breakdown in the
working relationship among those five Justices.  There are strong
textual indications that much of the joint dissent was originally
written as a majority opinion, with Chief Justice Roberts on board.
Soon after the ruling was issued, leaks from the Court to the press
indicated that the Chief Justice and the four dissenters were
indeed initially united in declaring the individual mandate uncon-
stitutional.  See generally Adam Liptak, After Ruling, Roberts Makes
a Getaway from the Scorn, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2012, at A10;
Jonathan Peters, The Supreme Court Leaks, SLATE.COM, July 6,
2012, available at http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_
politics/jurisprudence/2012/07/the_supreme_court_leaking_john
_robert_s_decision_to_change_his_mind_on_health_care_should
_not_come_as_such_a_surprise_.html.
15. Compare Randy Barnett, We Lost on Health Care.  But the
Constitution Won., WASH. POST, June 29, 2012, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/randy-barnett-we-lost-
on-health-care-but-the-const i tut ion-won/2012/06/29/
gJQAzJuJCW_story.html (“The Supreme Court has definitively
ruled that the [individual mandate exceeded Congress’s commerce
power].”), with Deborah Pearlstein, Early Thoughts on the Health
Care Case, BALKINIZATION, June 28, 2012, http://balkin.blog
spot.com/2012/06/early-thoughts-on-health-care-case.html
(“Aren’t all the opinions (the dissent + Roberts’ opinion for him-
self) concluding that the mandate exceeds the Commerce Clause
power just dicta?”).
16. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
tally chang[e] the relation between the citizen and the federal
government.”5 On the government’s reading of the commerce
power, he said, Congress could “justify a mandatory purchase
to solve almost any problem,”6 regulating people’s lives “from
cradle to grave.”7 The Commerce Clause authorizes Congress
to regulate only extant economic activities, the Chief Justice
concluded, and individuals who have not purchased health
insurance and are not currently seeking medical care are not
active in the healthcare market.8
In a rare joint opinion9 that they formally cast as a dissent,
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito made arguments
that were substantially the same as the Chief Justice’s.  They
found that “one does not regulate commerce that does not
exist by compelling its existence,”10 and that saying otherwise
would “extend federal power to virtually everything,”11 mak-
ing “mere breathing in and out the basis for federal prescrip-
tion.”12 The four Justices drew a connection between the deci-
sion-making freedom that the Act’s challengers were claiming
and the limitations on Congress’s powers, arguing that when
we disregard those limitations “we place liberty at peril.”13
Although their arguments closely tracked one another, the
Chief Justice and the four dissenters did not join one another’s
opinions.14 One is thus left to wonder whether the five
Republican appointees’ reading of the Commerce Clause car-
ries the force of binding precedent.15 The well-known Marks
doctrine does not squarely answer that question; it simply
states that, when five or more Justices agree on which litigant
should prevail in a given case but do not agree on the reasons,
lower courts should regard themselves as bound by the “posi-
tion taken by those Members who concurred in the judgment
on the narrowest grounds.”16 In NFIB, however, the members
of the joint dissent were indeed dissenters, rather than mem-
bers concurring in the judgment.  Does that matter?  In a pos-
sible attempt to ensure that his analysis of the commerce issue
would be seen as essential to the ultimate outcome of the case
and thus binding on lower courts (with or without the support
of the four dissenters), the Chief Justice wrote that he would
not ultimately have found merit
in the government’s Taxing
Power argument if he had not
first rejected the government’s
reading of the Commerce Clause.
Whether that explanation is suf-
ficient to give the Chief Justice’s
commerce analysis the force of
precedent remains to be seen.
THE TAXING POWER AND
THE (NON-)MANDATE
As a fallback argument, the
government contended that the
individual mandate actually was not a mandate at all.  Rather,
that provision of the Act could be upheld as a simple exercise
of Congress’s power to levy taxes.  On this view, individuals are
not legally required to purchase health insurance; they simply
are assessed an additional tax if they opt not to do so.  All nine
justices believed that, if Congress had squarely called the
“shared responsibility payment” a “tax,” rather than a
“penalty,” the legislation could indeed have been sustained on
those grounds.  But Congress used the language of penalties,
not taxes.  Did that choice of wording matter?
Not in the eyes of five justices.  Joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, Chief Justice Roberts said that
Congress’s choice of labels was not dispositive.  Under the
Court’s precedent, the Chief Justice explained, the Taxing
Power allows Congress to impose taxes, but not penalties.
These five justices found that the Act’s shared responsibility
payment fell into the former category:  it was imposed only on
those who were required to file federal income taxes; the
amount of the payment was to be calculated as a percentage of
individuals’ taxable income; the payment requirement was to
be enforced by the IRS; the measure was expected to produce
substantial revenue for the government; and the legislation
lacked the kind of scienter requirement that one typically finds
Court Review - Volume 48 113
One is thus left
to wonder
whether the five
Republican
appointees’
reading of the
Commerce Clause
carries the force
of binding 
precedent.
17. 132 S. Ct. at 2651 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dis-
senting).
18. Id. at 2655 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
19. Id. at 2604 (Roberts, C.J.).
20. Id. (Roberts, C.J.).
21. Id. at 2605 (Roberts, C.J.).
22. Id. at 2662 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, J.J., dissenting).
23. 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012).
in the context of civil and crim-
inal penalties.  The majority
concluded that individuals thus
are free to opt against carrying
health insurance; those making
that choice simply must pay
higher federal taxes when filing
their annual returns.
For Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Alito, however,
Congress’s choice of terminol-
ogy was controlling.  “The issue
is not whether Congress had
the power to frame the mini-
mum-coverage provision as a tax,” the joint dissenters wrote,
“but whether it did so.”17 In their view, the plain language of
the Act indicated that Congress had issued a mandate,
enforced by a penalty.  “To say that the Individual Mandate
merely imposes a tax,” the joint dissenters concluded, “is not
to interpret the statute but to rewrite it.”18 That argument sets
the stage for future battles about when Congress’s choice of
labels is and is not dispositive on the question of whether
Congress has properly exercised a given enumerated power.
THE SPENDING POWER AND THE MEDICAID
EXPANSION
Although the Court had occasionally suggested that
Congress’s conditional grants to the States would be unconsti-
tutional if they did not give states the freedom to reject the
conditions and decline the federal money, the Court had never
struck down a set of conditions on those grounds.  In NFIB,
however, seven justices concluded that Congress had crossed
the line separating permissible enticement from unconstitu-
tional coercion.
Joined by Justices Breyer and Kagan, Chief Justice Roberts
found that, by threatening to withhold all of a state’s Medicaid
funds, Congress had not merely encouraged the States to par-
ticipate in the program’s expansion; rather, those conditions
were “a gun to the head.”19 The Chief Justice identified three
features of the Act that, taken together, were impermissibly
coercive:  federal Medicaid funds account for a large percent-
age of many states’ annual revenues; “the States have devel-
oped intricate statutory and administrative regimes over the
course of many decades to implement their objectives under
existing Medicaid”;20 and the Medicaid expansion was not a
mere alteration or amendment of the sort that Congress had
reserved the power to make, but instead amounted to an
entirely new program, marked by “a shift in kind, not merely
degree.”21 The four justices in the joint dissent agreed, finding
that “[i]f the anticoercion rule does not apply in this case, then
there is no such rule.”22
Two members of the Court found the conditions permissi-
ble.  Joined by Justice Sotomayor, Justice Ginsburg found that,
by expressly reserving the right to “alter” or “amend” the
Medicaid program, Congress had long ago put the states on
notice that a large expansion of the program was possible.
States had been further alerted to the possibility of a significant
expansion by all of the earlier occasions when, in smaller ways,
Congress had placed additional segments of the population
under the protection of the Medicaid umbrella.  She also
doubted the efficacy of her seven colleagues’ conclusion:  to
avoid the constitutional constraints that the majority had iden-
tified, she said, Congress simply could have repealed the entire
Medicaid program and then announced the creation of a new,
much broader benefits program identical to the one that
Congress envisioned in the Act.
On the question of what to do about the Spending Clause
violation that the other Justices had found, however, Justices
Ginsburg and Sotomayor joined the Chief Justice and Justices
Breyer and Kagan.  Those five justices concluded that the solu-
tion was not to invalidate the Medicaid expansion in its
entirety, but rather to enforce the Act’s conditions only with
respect to the new funding that Congress was offering for the
program’s expansion.  The four members of the joint dissent
would have scrapped the expansion altogether.
Going forward, one of the big challenges in Spending
Clause litigation will be further clarifying the line that sepa-
rates enticement from coercion.  What percentage of a state’s
federal revenues can the federal government permissibly
threaten to cut?  When and how does a state institutionalize a
given federal program to such a degree that Congress cannot
safely threaten to eliminate it?  How does one distinguish
between an amendment to a program and the creation of an
entirely new, subsuming program?  Were Justices Ginsburg and
Sotomayor right when they suggested that Congress could
evade the seven Justices’ Spending Clause restrictions by can-
celing an old program altogether and replacing it with a new
program of conditional federal spending?
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
DEFERENCE TO AGENCIES
In Christopher v. Smithkline Beecham Corp.,23 the Court was
asked to determine whether pharmaceutical companies’
“detailers”—employees who provide physicians with informa-
tion about drugs with the hope that physicians will prescribe
those drugs for their patients—are “outside salesmen” within
the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act.  Dividing 5-4, the
Court held that detailers are indeed outside salesmen and that
they thus do not benefit from the FLSA’s overtime-pay provi-
sions.  There was one point, however, on which all nine
Justices agreed:  the Department of Labor’s statutory interpre-
tation did not merit any deference from the Court.  Led by
Justice Alito, the five Justices in the majority elaborated on
their reasons for refusing to defer to the agency’s reading of the
FLSA.  The department’s employee-favoring interpretation
would “impose massive liability on [pharmaceuticals] for con-
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24. Id. at 2167-70.
25. 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012).
26. 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012).
27. Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 724 S.E.2d 250, 278-80 (W.
Va. 2011).
28. Id. at 292.
29. 132 S. Ct. at 1202.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1203 (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct.
1740, 1747 (2011)).
32. 132 S. Ct. 23 (2011).
duct that occurred well before that interpretation was
announced”; the agency never voiced any objection over the
many decades in which pharmaceutical companies treated
their detailers as outside salesmen; the agency’s initial inter-
pretation “lack[ed] the hallmarks of thorough consideration”
because it was first announced in a 2009 amicus brief without
any period for public comment; the agency’s interpretation
shifted during the course of litigation; and, in the eyes of the
majority, the agency’s reading of the statute was at odds with
the plain language of the statute.24
JUDICIAL REVIEW
In Sackett v. EPA,25 the Court unanimously ruled that the
owners of a residential lakeside lot were entitled to immediate
judicial review of a compliance order issued to them by the
Environmental Protection Agency.  The Sacketts had filled a
portion of their property with dirt and rock.  The EPA deter-
mined that the Sacketts had thereby discharged pollutants into
federal waters, and so issued a compliance order, directing the
Sacketts to restore the property.  For each day that the Sacketts
refused to comply, they faced civil penalties of up to $75,000.
Rather than wait for the EPA to file a civil enforcement action
while the possible penalties piled up, the Sacketts sought judi-
cial review under the Administrative Procedure Act, challeng-
ing the EPA’s claim that the Sacketts’ lot contained wetlands or
waters within the agency’s jurisdiction.  Writing for the Court,
Justice Scalia found that the EPA’s compliance order was suffi-
ciently final to merit judicial review under the APA and that
the Clean Water Act did not bar such pre-enforcement review.
ARBITRATION
In a trio of rulings, the Court expressed varying degrees of
frustration with lower courts for failing to follow what the
Court regarded as the clear requirements of the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA).  
Most of the Court’s impatience was directed toward the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia in Marmet Health
Care Center, Inc. v. Brown.26 In that case, family members of three
patients had entered into contracts with nursing homes.  A
clause in those contracts stated that the parties would arbitrate
any disputes that arose between them.  After the three patients
died, the family members sued the nursing homes, alleging that
the homes had negligently caused the patients’ deaths.  Denying
the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia did little to disguise its unhap-
piness with the Supreme Court’s FAA precedent.  Citing schol-
ars and dissenting justices, the West Virginia court stated that
Congress had intended the FAA “to serve only as a procedural
statute for disputes brought in federal courts,” that Congress had
intended the FAA to apply only in cases involving “contracts
between merchants with relatively equal bargaining power,” and
that the Supreme Court’s expansive interpretations of the FAA
were the result of “tendentious rea-
soning” and a willingness to create
doctrines “from whole cloth.”27
The West Virginia court neverthe-
less believed it had spotted an
opening in the Supreme Court’s
precedent—the Court had never
before explicitly addressed the
enforcement of pre-injury arbitra-
tion agreements in healthcare con-
tracts or in personal-injury or
wrongful-death cases.  The state
court filled that perceived gap by
ruling that the public policy of West Virginia barred enforcing
“an arbitration clause in a nursing home admission agreement
adopted prior to an occurrence of negligence that results in a
personal injury or wrongful death.”28
In a unanimous per curiam ruling, the Supreme Court
reversed, finding that the West Virginia court had patently
“misread[] and disregard[ed]” the Supreme Court’s prece-
dent.29 Noting the state court’s disparaging remarks about the
Court’s FAA rulings, the justices wrote that “[w]hen this Court
has fulfilled its duty to interpret federal law, a state court may
not contradict or fail to implement the rule so established.”30
The FAA does not include any exception relating to personal-
injury or wrongful-death cases, the Court observed.  All three
cases thus were governed by the rule that the Court had reaf-
firmed just two months before the West Virginia court handed
down its decision:  “‘[W]hen state law prohibits outright the
arbitration of a particular type of claim, the analysis is straight-
forward: The conflicting rule is displaced by the FAA.’”31
The Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal provoked
another unanimous per curiam ruling in KPMG LLP v. Cocchi,32
though the tone of the exchange between the two courts was
less prickly.  In that case, investors who allegedly lost millions
of dollars in the Bernard Madoff scandal filed a lawsuit against
the partnerships that had invested their money and against
those partnerships’ auditing firm, KPMG.  With respect to
KPMG, the investors stated four causes of action.  KPMG
moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitration clause that
appeared in its contracts with the investment partnerships.  The
Court of Appeal stated that the arbitration clause could be
enforced against the investors only if their claims were deriva-
tive in nature, thereby bringing them within the ambit of the
partnerships’ contracts with KPMG.  Citing Delaware law, the
court concluded that two of the investors’ claims against KPMG
were direct, and thus beyond the reach of the arbitration
clauses.  The court failed to say anything about the investors’
other two claims, however, apparently believing that if the court
could not compel arbitration of some of the investors’ claims,
then the entire case should remain in state court.
The Supreme Court reversed, faulting “the Court of
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Appeal’s apparent refusal to
compel arbitration on any of
the four claims based solely on
a finding that two of them . . .
were nonarbitrable.”33 The
Court stated that trial courts
are obliged to enforce arbitra-
tion agreements “‘even when
the result would be the possi-
bly inefficient maintenance of
separate proceedings in differ-
ent forums.’”34 The Court
remanded the case with
instructions to determine
whether the arbitration agreement was enforceable with
respect to the investors’ other two causes of action.
The Court’s third arbitration ruling of the Term was the only
one to spark at least minimal disagreement among the Justices.
In CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood,35 individuals who had
obtained Aspire Visa cards filed a class action against the card’s
marketer and issuer.  The cardholders alleged that, in various
ways, the defendants had violated the Credit Repair
Organizations Act (CROA), a federal statute regulating organi-
zations that purport to help individuals improve their credit
records, histories, or ratings.  The defendants moved to com-
pel arbitration, citing an arbitration clause that appeared in the
card applications that the plaintiffs had signed.  The cardhold-
ers resisted, arguing that Congress had intended to exempt
CROA claims from the requirements of the FAA.  Their argu-
ment centered primarily on a statutorily required disclosure
statement that the defendants had given them.  In that disclo-
sure statement, the defendants had stated that cardholders had
“a right to sue a credit repair organization that violates the
[CROA].”36 That statement, coupled with a provision of the
CROA that declared certain statutory rights nonwaivable, led
the cardholders to the conclusion that they had a right to sue
the defendants in court, and that the arbitration clauses in
their card applications could not waive that right.  
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was persuaded by the
cardholders’ argument, but a majority of the Supreme Court
was not.  Writing for six members of the Court, Justice Scalia
explained that the disclosure statement told the cardholders
that they were entitled to enforce their rights under the statute,
but did not itself confer any of those rights.  Those rights were
conferred in other statutory provisions, he said, and those
other provisions did not clearly state that cardholders had a
right to sue in court.  Justice Sotomayor and Justice Kagan con-
curred in the judgment, stating that the parties’ arguments
were “in equipoise” and that the cardholders had thus failed to
carry “the burden of showing that Congress disallowed arbi-
tration of their claims.”37 Justice Ginsburg filed a lone dissent.
In her view, the majority had ironically interpreted anti-decep-
tion legislation in a manner that permitted credit-repair orga-
nizations to deceive vulnerable consumers about their rights.
BIVENS AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
In Minneci v. Pollard,38 the Court refused to allow a prisoner
to bring an Eighth Amendment Bivens action against employ-
ees of a privately operated federal prison.39 The prisoner
claimed that the defendants failed to provide him with proper
medical care after he injured his elbows and that the Eighth
Amendment itself provided him with a damages remedy.  The
odds were stacked against him from the beginning:  it had been
more than 30 years since the Court last agreed to recognize a
private cause of action directly under a constitutional provi-
sion.40 An eight-justice majority of the Court continued that
streak here.
Writing for the Court, Justice Breyer explained that “the
question is whether, in general, state tort law remedies provide
roughly similar incentives for potential defendants to comply
with the Eighth Amendment while also providing roughly sim-
ilar compensation to victims of violations.”41 The Court found
that, while federal legislation would have barred the prisoner
from bringing a state tort action against the prison officials if
those officials had been employed directly by the federal gov-
ernment, there was no such bar here because the defendants
were employed by a private firm.  The Court acknowledged
that state tort law might be somewhat “less generous” to the
prisoner than the proposed Bivens action, but found those dif-
ferences too small to be dispositive.42 Justice Ginsburg dis-
sented, arguing that the prisoner’s claim should not be
“remit[ed] to the ‘vagaries’ of state tort law.”43
EQUAL PROTECTION AND RATIONAL-BASIS REVIEW
In Armour v. City of Indianapolis,44 we were reminded of just
how easy it is for legislation to survive rational-basis review
under the Equal Protection Clause.  For a number of years, the
City of Indianapolis paid for sewer projects by imposing those
projects’ costs upon the owners of abutting properties.  In
2004, the city funded a residential sewer project in precisely
that way.  Pursuant to longstanding practice, homeowners in
that neighborhood were given the option of paying their share
of the costs (about $9,000 per household) in one lump sum or
over as many as thirty years.  The following year, however, the
city adopted a new financing system for sewer projects, impos-
ing much lower fees on benefiting property owners and cover-
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ing the balance of the costs with bonds.  When the city made
the switch, it told homeowners who were paying their past
obligations in installments that their remaining debts were for-
given, but it refused to issue refunds to homeowners who had
already paid their debts in full.  Many of the homeowners who
had already paid off their debts sued the city, alleging a viola-
tion of their equal-protection rights.
Affirming Indiana’s high court, the Supreme Court found a
rational basis for the city’s differing treatment of the homeown-
ers.  Writing for six justices, Justice Breyer said that either of the
city’s other alternatives—asking the installment-paying home-
owners to continue paying down their debts or issuing refunds
to those who had already paid their obligations in full—would
have entailed administrative costs that the city rationally could
have wished to avoid.  Joined by Justices Scalia and Alito, Chief
Justice Roberts dissented.  The Chief Justice agreed that “we
give great leeway to taxing authorities in this area,” but argued
that “every generation or so a case comes along when this Court
needs to say enough is enough, if the Equal Protection Clause
is to retain any force in this context.”45
FEDERAL JURISDICTION 
FEDERAL CAUSES OF ACTION
In Mims v. Arrow Financial Services,46 the Court unani-
mously ruled that state and federal courts have concurrent
subject-matter jurisdiction over private claims brought under
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991.  The Act pro-
vides a private cause of action for invasive telemarketing prac-
tices and authorizes plaintiffs to sue “in an appropriate court
of [a] State” if such an action is “otherwise permitted by the
laws or rules of court of [that] State.”47 The justices found that
Congress did not thereby grant state courts exclusive jurisdic-
tion over private claims brought under the Act.  Writing for the
Court, Justice Ginsburg explained that when federal law cre-
ates a cause of action and provides the substantive rules for
adjudicating that cause of action, there is a strong presumption
in favor of at least concurrent original federal jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  That presumption can be overcome
only if—contrary to the facts here—Congress made it clear
that it intended to divest the federal courts of their power to
adjudicate the claims.
POLITICAL-QUESTION DOCTRINE
In Zivotofsky v. Clinton,48 the Court clarified the scope of the
political-question doctrine.  The State Department had
adopted a policy directing passport officials to list Jerusalem,
rather than Israel, as the place of birth when preparing pass-
ports for persons born in Jerusalem.  In 2002, Congress
responded by enacting legislation stating that individuals born
in Jerusalem could, upon their or their guardians’ request, list
Israel as their place of birth on their birth certificates or pass-
ports.  Upon Menachem Zovotofsky’s birth in Jerusalem, his
parents (who were American citizens) applied for a United
States passport for him and asked that his place of birth be
listed as “Jerusalem, Israel.”
Citing its policy, the State
Department refused and issued
Zivotosky a passport that listed
only “Jerusalem” as his place of
birth.  His parents sued the
Secretary of State for declara-
tory and injunctive relief.
Affirming the district court’s
dismissal of the case as a non-
justiciable political question,
the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit found that
adjudicating the case would
interfere with the Executive’s
exclusive power to recognize
foreign sovereigns and deter-
mine the political status of Jerusalem.  The Supreme Court
reversed and remanded.  Writing for six members of the Court,
Chief Justice Roberts agreed that the federal judiciary cannot
itself decide whether Jerusalem is Israel’s capital, but found
that the case presented separate questions over which the
courts do have the power to speak—namely, whether the
Secretary of State violated Zivotofsky’s federal statutory rights
and whether the legislation on which Zivotofsky relied is con-
stitutional.  If the statute infringes upon the President’s power,
the Court wrote, then the courts should declare the statute
unconstitutional, rather than declare the case nonjusticiable.
FIFTH AMENDMENT—DUE PROCESS
Many court-watchers had anticipated that the Federal
Communications Commission’s recent actions against Fox
Television Stations and ABC for fleeting expletives and fleeting
nudity would prompt the Court to reassess its 1978 ruling in
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.49 Pacifica has come under increas-
ing pressure in recent years, as changes in technology and the
media landscape have caused many to wonder whether the
Pacifica Court’s rationales for allowing the government to
restrict broadcasts of indecency remain apt.  It turns out, how-
ever, that the FCC’s enforcement actions against Fox and ABC
tripped over the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
instead, leaving the First Amendment issues to be decided
another day.
In FCC v. Fox Television Stations (consolidated with FCC v.
ABC, Inc.),50 the Court focused on three instances of alleged
indecency:  Cher’s unscripted use of the f-word during the
2002 Billboard Music Awards, broadcast by Fox; Nicole
Richie’s unscripted use of the s- and f-words during the same
awards show on Fox the following year; and a seven-second
display of an actress’s buttocks (together with a momentary
side view of one of her breasts) during a 2003 episode of ABC’s
NYPD Blue.
To understand the Court’s decision, a brief timeline is
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required.  When the Pacifica
Court announced First
Amendment standards allowing
the FCC to regulate the broad-
cast of indecent speech, it explic-
itly noted that it was reserving
judgment on whether “an occa-
sional expletive . . . would justify
any sanction.”51 For many years,
the FCC took few actions against
broadcast indecency.  In 2001,
the FCC signaled that it would
begin to move more aggressively
against indecency, but stated that
an enforcement action was less
likely if the given instance of
alleged indecency was “‘fleeting
in nature.’”52 In response to an award recipient’s use the f-word
during NBC’s 2003 broadcast of the Golden Globe Awards,
however, the FCC issued what has come to be known as the
Golden Globes Order, finding that NBC’s broadcast of the f-word
was indecent despite its single and momentary use.
The FCC applied the Golden Globes standard against Fox
and ABC, even though their broadcasts occurred prior to the
Golden Globes Order, and even though in Golden Globes itself
the FCC opted not to fine NBC because the agency recognized
it was using that case to announce new standards.  With Justice
Sotomayor not participating, eight justices concluded that the
FCC’s actions against Fox and ABC were unconstitutional.
Justice Kennedy wrote for seven members of the Court, find-
ing that punishing Fox and ABC would violate the fundamen-
tal due-process principle “that laws which regulate persons or
entities must give fair notice of conduct that is forbidden.”53 At
the time of the FOX and ABC broadcasts, the Court found, the
FCC’s policies “gave no notice to Fox or ABC that a fleeting
expletive or a brief shot of nudity could be actionably inde-
cent.”54 The Court thus found it unnecessary to determine the
constitutionality of the Golden Globes Order or to reassess the
Pacifica standards.
Justice Ginsburg concurred in the judgment, briefly stating
that Pacifica “was wrong when issued” and that “[t]ime, tech-
nological advances, and the Commission’s untenable rulings in
the cases now before the Court show why Pacifica bears recon-
sideration.”55 Five months later, concurring in the Court’s
denial of certiorari in the case concerning Janet Jackson’s
(in)famous “wardrobe malfunction” during a Super Bowl half-
time performance,56 Justice Ginsburg encouraged the FCC to
“reconsider its indecency policy in light of technological
advances and the Commission’s uncertain course of conduct
since this Court’s ruling in [Pacifica].”57
FIRST AMENDMENT—RELIGION
In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v.
EEOC,58 the Court ruled that both the Free Exercise Clause
and the Establishment Clause bar ministers from suing their
religious employers for employment discrimination.  Hosanna-
Tabor had hired Cheryl Perich to work as a schoolteacher.
Based on Perich’s completion of a variety of academic require-
ments, Hosanna-Tabor had designated Perich as a “called”
teacher, granting her the title of “Minister of Religion,
Commissioned.”  In that capacity, Perich spent most of her
time teaching secular subjects, but she also taught a religion
class several days each week, led students in prayer, attended
weekly chapel services, and led those chapel services twice
each year.  After Perich missed a significant portion of the
2004-2005 school year due to illness, Hosanna-Tabor hired
another teacher to fill the gap for the remainder of the year.
Perich insisted that she be allowed to return to work, but
Hosanna-Tabor refused.  When Perich threatened to take legal
action to protect her rights, Hosanna-Tabor terminated her, cit-
ing her threat of litigation.  The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission sued Hosanna-Tabor on Perich’s
behalf, alleging that Hosanna-Tabor had violated the
Americans with Disabilities Act by retaliating against Perich
for threatening to vindicate her ADA rights. Hosanna-Tabor
argued that it had terminated Perich because, by threatening to
sue, she had violated the church’s religious teaching that
church members should resolve their disputes internally.
Led by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court ruled unanimously
in Hosanna-Tabor’s favor, joining the many circuit courts that
had already recognized a “ministerial exception” to employ-
ment-discrimination laws.  “Requiring a church to accept or
retain an unwanted minister,” the Chief Justice wrote, “inter-
feres with the internal governance of the church, depriving the
church of control over the selection of those who will person-
ify its beliefs.”59 The Court declined “to adopt a rigid formula
for determining when an employee qualifies as a minister,”
choosing instead to begin its line of “ministerial exception”
cases by engaging in a fact-intensive analysis of Perich’s own
circumstances.60 The Court found that Perich was a minister
because Hosanna-Tabor had formally designated her in those
terms, Perich had held herself out to the church and others as
a minister, and Perich’s job duties included conveying the
church’s teachings and performing other religious functions. In
response to the EEOC’s insistence that recognizing a minister-
ial exception would license religious groups to engage in
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objectionable behavior (such as hiring children or aliens, or
punishing ministerial employees for reporting criminal con-
duct), the Court said that it would “address the applicability of
the exception to other circumstances if and when they arise.”61
FIRST AMENDMENT—SPEECH
In addition to Reichle v. Howards62 (which concerned speech
but is better categorized as a qualified-immunity case) and
FCC v. Fox Television Stations63 (which has First Amendment
implications but is better categorized as a Fifth Amendment
case), the Court decided two noteworthy civil free-speech
cases last Term.64
CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND CORPORATE SPEECH
In its 2010 ruling in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission, the Supreme Court ruled (among other things)
that “independent expenditures, including those made by cor-
porations, do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of
corruption” in American elections.65 The following year, the
Montana Supreme Court declared that, due to that State’s par-
ticularly rocky history of corporate corruption in state politics,
the Montana Legislature was permitted to impose civil penal-
ties on any corporation that makes “a contribution or an
expenditure in connection with a candidate or a political com-
mittee that supports or opposes a candidate or a political
party.”66 In American Tradition Partnership v. Bullock,67 a five-
justice majority of the Court summarily reversed in a one-page
per curiam ruling, finding Citizens United wholly dispositive.
Joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, Justice
Breyer filed a short dissent, stating that Citizens United was
wrongly decided and that, even if the Court’s ruling in that case
were apt in some jurisdictions, Montana’s history gave it a par-
ticularly “compelling interest in limiting independent expen-
ditures by corporations.”68
UNIONS—NONMEMBERS AND SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS
Although the Court’s holding in Knox v. Service Employees
International Union69 is noteworthy in its own right, far more
significant is five justices’ suggestion in dicta that prior courts
have given their blessing to arrangements that might violate
the First Amendment.
Under the Court’s past cases, a public-sector union may
annually bill nonmember employees in a given unit to help pay
the costs of that unit’s “chargeable expenses”—namely, the costs
of engaging in the kind of collective-bargaining activities that
inure to the benefit of all of a unit’s employees.  The Court has
said, however, that the First Amendment bars a union from forc-
ing nonmembers to help pay for the union’s political and ideo-
logical activities.  Following the procedure approved in Teachers
v. Hudson,70 a union can annu-
ally notify members and non-
members alike of what the
union’s dues will be for the com-
ing year, so long as it gives non-
members an opportunity to “opt
out” from the union’s political
and ideological activities and
thus pay reduced fees targeted
solely for the union’s anticipated
chargeable expenses.
In Knox, a public-sector
union in California (the SEIU)
announced to members and
nonmembers what the annual
dues would be for 2005 and
gave nonmembers a period of
time to opt out from the political and ideological portion of the
tab.  After that opt-out period had closed, however, the SEIU
concluded that it needed to raise additional money quickly to
engage in political battles that were taking shape in the state.
The SEIU issued a special assessment aimed at creating what it
called “a Political Fight-Back Fund.”  It did not give nonmem-
bers the ability to opt out, but it did tell those nonmembers
who earlier had opted out from the political and ideological
portion of the annual dues that they could pay a comparably
reduced portion of the special assessment.
Joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas, Justice Alito found that the First
Amendment obliged the SEIU to provide nonmembers with a
period of time in which to decide whether they wanted to con-
tribute to the Fight-Back Fund, and that the union could col-
lect funds from nonmembers for the Fight-Back Fund only if
they affirmatively opted in.  Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg
concurred in the judgment, agreeing that the SEIU had vio-
lated nonmembers’ rights but objecting to the majority’s deci-
sion to require an opt-in (rather than an opt-out) scheme.71
What is most significant about the ruling—and what espe-
cially drew the criticism of Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg in
their concurrence in the judgment and Justices Breyer and
Kagan in their dissent—was the discomfort that the majority
expressed with some of the Court’s prior rulings regarding
unions and nonmember employees.  Justice Alito stressed that
forcing public-sector employees to contribute to unions—even
if for collective-bargaining activities—raises serious First
Amendment concerns.  “Our cases to date have tolerated this
‘impingement,’” he wrote, “and we do not revisit today
whether the Court’s former cases have given adequate recogni-
tion to the critical First Amendment rights at stake.”72 He
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expressed strong doubts
about whether the desire to
prevent free-riding was suf-
ficient to justify those
forced contributions by
nonmembers.  He also crit-
icized the current rule that
unions can require non-
members to opt out if they
do not wish to pay for the
union’s political and ideo-
logical activities as part of
their annual fees, rather
than presume that non-
members do not wish to
contribute and therefore
require them to opt in if
that presumption is mistaken.  Justice Alito stated that the cur-
rent arrangement is “ a remarkable boon for unions,” that the
Court has paid “surprisingly little attention” to the choice
between opt-out and opt-in arrangements, and that the Court’s
prior approval of opt-out schemes is “an historical accident”
resulting from the Court’s thinly considered “dicta” in a case
half a century ago.73 The majority indicated that those past
rulings “approach, if they do not cross, the limit of what the
First Amendment can tolerate,” but the justices did not find it
necessary to resolve that question here.74 Non-union employ-
ees who bristle at the current state of the law undoubtedly will
find in Knox an invitation to give the Court an opportunity to
address these matters anew.
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
The Court decided two noteworthy qualified-immunity
cases last Term, the first dealing with private individuals’ enti-
tlement to qualified immunity when they do short-term work
for governmental bodies and the second dealing with retalia-
tory arrests.
Invoking memories of a time in American history when pri-
vate individuals frequently stepped in to help city, state, and
federal entities carry out their business, the Court ruled in
Filarsky v. Delia75 that a private attorney may claim qualified
immunity when sued under Section 1983 for the role he played
in helping city officials investigate allegations of wrongdoing
by a city employee.  The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit had held that the attorney could not claim qual-
ified immunity because he was not a city employee.  The
Supreme Court unanimously reversed.  Writing for the Court,
Chief Justice Roberts returned to the familiar principle that
Section 1983 did not abrogate well-established common-law
immunities.  Citing numerous examples, the Chief Justice said
that, in the years leading up to Section 1983’s enactment, gov-
ernments frequently retained private individuals to help do the
public’s work, and courts did not distinguish between those
private individuals and government employees when affording
immunity to suit.
In Reichle v. Howards,76 the Court ruled that Secret Service
agents could raise the qualified-immunity defense in a lawsuit
arising from an incident that occurred when they were pro-
tecting Vice President Dick Cheney at a Colorado shopping
mall.  Steven Howards had approached the Vice President and
told him that the administration’s policies in Iraq were “dis-
gusting,” then touched the Vice President’s shoulder as the
Vice President walked away.  Secret Service agents approached
Howards, who falsely denied touching the Vice President.
Possessing probable cause to believe that Howards had lied to
them and had physically touched the Vice President, the agents
placed Howards under arrest.  State officials charged him with
harassment, but those charges were later dropped.  Howards
then sued the agents under Section 1983 and Bivens, alleging
that the agents had arrested him in retaliation for his remarks
to the Vice President about Iraq.  Writing for six members of
the Court, Justice Thomas found that the agents were entitled
to qualified immunity because “it was not clearly established
that an arrest supported by probable cause could violate the
First Amendment.”77 The Court reserved judgment on the
merits of the overarching constitutional question, declining to
say whether a person does indeed have a First Amendment
right to be free from a retaliatory arrest when officials have
probable cause to arrest on other grounds.  Joined by Justice
Breyer, Justice Ginsburg concurred in the judgment.
Distinguishing ordinary law-enforcement officers from those
charged with protecting public officials, she argued that the
former would not be entitled to qualified immunity in compa-
rable circumstances, but that officers charged with making
split-second assessments of threats to public officials are enti-
tled to rely on an individual’s statements when determining
whether that person poses an immediate threat of harm.
(Justice Kagan did not participate in the case.)
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE FMLA
In Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland,78 the Court
returned to the task of evaluating efforts by Congress to use its
powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to abro-
gate a state’s sovereign immunity.  Daniel Coleman had sued the
Maryland Court of Appeals (his former employer), alleging that
the court violated his rights under the Family and Medical Leave
Act by denying him sick leave.  The FMLA identifies several cir-
cumstances in which an eligible employee is annually entitled to
up to twelve weeks of leave.  Most of the statute’s provisions con-
cern instances in which an employee needs to care for an ailing
family member, but the “self-care” provision on which Coleman
relied entitles an employee to obtain leave when “a serious
health condition . . . makes the employee unable to perform the
functions of” his or her job.79 The Court already had ruled in
Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs80 that Congress
validly stripped the states of their immunity for violations of one
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SUPREMACY CLAUSE
In Douglas v. Independent
Living Center of Southern
California,85 a slim majority of
the Court decided to sidestep,
at least for the time being, the
difficult question on which it
had granted certiorari:  can
Medicaid providers and benefi-
ciaries maintain a cause of
action directly under the
Supremacy Clause to enjoin
state officials from implement-
ing state regulations that
allegedly are preempted by fed-
eral law?  To alleviate stress on
its budget, California had
announced that it planned to
reduce the rates at which it
would reimburse certain
Medicaid providers.  Pursuant
to federal requirements,
California submitted those
plans to the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) for approval.  While that request for approval
was pending, various Medicaid providers and beneficiaries
filed federal lawsuits seeking to enjoin California officials from
implementing the reimbursement reductions.  The plaintiffs
argued that California’s plans conflicted with—and thus were
preempted by—Section 30(A) of the Medicaid Act, which
requires states to provide reimbursements “sufficient to enlist
enough providers so that care and services are available under
the plan at least to the extent that such care and services are
available to the general population in the geographic area.”86
After the case was orally argued before the Supreme Court, the
CMS approved most of the state’s planned reductions, finding
them consistent with the Medicaid Act’s requirements.  The
Court then had to determine whether the CMS’s approval had
any bearing on the Court’s disposition of the case.
Writing on behalf of himself and Justices Kennedy,
Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, Justice Breyer concluded
that the case should be remanded without immediate resolu-
tion of the Supremacy Clause issue.  Given the CMS’s approval
of the reductions, Justice Breyer found, it was possible that the
unhappy Medicaid providers and beneficiaries should now be
required to seek judicial review of the CMS’s decision under
the Administrative Procedure Act, rather than continue to
press for relief in an action brought directly under the
Supremacy Clause.  Justice Breyer hinted that the plaintiffs
faced an uphill climb:  the CMS was not a party to the pending
Supremacy Clause litigation, making that litigation an ineffi-
cient vehicle for adjudicating the merits of the agency’s find-
ings; allowing a Supremacy Clause action to proceed would
81. 132 S. Ct. at 1335 (plurality op.).
82. Id. at 1336 (plurality op.).
83. Id. at 1338 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
84. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
85. 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A).
of the family-care provisions because Congress was rectifying a
history of sex-based discrimination in states’ administration of
their family-leave policies.  Here in Coleman, however, five jus-
tices concluded that states retained their immunity against dam-
ages suits for violations of the self-care provision.
Justice Kennedy wrote for a plurality of the Court, joined by
the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas and Alito.  Invoking the
Court’s reigning Section 5 analysis, the plurality found that the
self-care provision was not “congruent and proportional” to any
pattern of unconstitutional behavior by the states, and thus
amounted to an effort by Congress to rewrite the Fourteenth
Amendment.81 When Congress enacted the FMLA, the plural-
ity wrote, nearly all state employees were covered by paid sick-
leave plans, and Congress never identified any pattern of sex
discrimination in the states’ administration of those plans.  The
plurality rejected Coleman’s argument that the self-care provi-
sion was meant to attack sex discrimination in tandem with the
family-care provisions.  Coleman’s argument went like this:  if
only the FMLA’s family-care provisions had been enacted, some
public and private employers would fear that women would
miss a lot of work to care for sick family members; those
employers thus would have an incentive to discriminate against
female job applicants; and so Congress added the self-care pro-
vision to provide a category of leave that men would use,
thereby helping to close the gap between the amounts of time
that men and women could be expected to miss work.  The plu-
rality found this argument “overly complicated,” “unconvinc-
ing,” and unsupported by the legislative record.82
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment, reiterating his
view that, “outside the context of racial discrimination (which
is different for stare decisis reasons),” the congruence and pro-
portionality test should be abandoned and Congress’s power
under Section 5 should be limited to regulating “conduct that
itself violates the Fourteenth Amendment.”83
Justice Ginsburg dissented, joined by Justices Breyer,
Sotomayor, and Kagan.  She found that Congress wrote the self-
care provision in broad, gender-neutral terms to shield women
from the discrimination that might result if federal law had
more narrowly provided self-care leaves only for illnesses relat-
ing to pregnancy and childbirth.  Drawing heavily from Hibbs,
Justice Ginsburg wrote that Congress had substantial evidence
of public employers’ discrimination against women—especially
pregnant women—in the workplace.  The dissent concluded by
offering employees a measure of solace.  As the Maryland court
itself conceded, Justice Ginsburg wrote, the self-care provision
is inarguably a valid exercise of Congress’s power under the
Commerce Clause.  While that is not sufficient under the
Court’s precedent to permit Congress to abrogate a state’s
immunity from suits for damages, she said, it is sufficient for
employees to get injunctive relief under Ex parte Young84 and for
the federal government to seek relief on an employee’s behalf.
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cause “inconsistency or confu-
sion” if the federal courts ulti-
mately reached a conclusion
that differed from the CMS’s
findings; and courts typically
owe a measure of deference to
agencies’ interpretations of the
legislation they have been
tasked with implementing.87
Joined by Justices Scalia,
Thomas, and Alito, Chief
Justice Roberts dissented,
arguing that the Court should
have resolved the Supremacy
Clause issue in favor of the
state.  Congress had not itself
provided a private cause of
action to enforce Section
30(A), the Chief Justice wrote,
and so permitting an action
directly under the Supremacy Clause would allow plaintiffs
to make an “end-run” around precedent that bars plaintiffs
from suing to enforce federal statutes in the absence of a
statutory cause of action.88 Acknowledging the longstanding
availability of injunctive relief against state officials under Ex
parte Young,89 the dissent argued that such relief is available
in the absence of a federal statutory cause of action only if—
unlike the Medicaid providers and beneficiaries here—the
plaintiff is threatened with a state enforcement proceeding
and wishes preemptively to assert a federal defense.  In sup-
port of that reading of Ex parte Young, the dissent cited a line
from a 2011 concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy.90 When
a majority of the Court agrees that the time is ripe to resolve
this important issue, Justice Kennedy might indeed cast the
decisive vote.
OTHER NOTABLE RULINGS
In Astrue v. Capato,91 the Court unanimously confirmed the
Social Security Administration’s finding that the two posthu-
mously conceived claimants in this case did not qualify for sur-
vivors benefits under the Social Security Act.  To determine
whether a given claimant is the “child” of a decedent and thus
eligible for survivors benefits, the Act directs the Social
Security Commissioner’s attention to the laws of intestacy in
the state where the claimant resides:  if the claimant is ineligi-
ble to inherit under that state’s intestacy laws, the claimant is
typically deemed not to be a “child” of the decedent within the
meaning of the Act.  The two claimants in this case resided in
Florida, which restricts intestate succession to individuals con-
ceived during the decedent’s lifetime.  The claimants (con-
ceived through in vitro fertilization after the father’s death)
thus were ineligible for survivors benefits.
In FAA v. Cooper,92 the Court ruled 5-4 that when Congress
stated in the Privacy Act of 1974 that an individual may sue an
agency for “actual damages” resulting from certain kinds of
“intentional or willful” violations of the Act,93 Congress did
not thereby waive the federal government’s sovereign immu-
nity against claims seeking damages for mental or emotional
distress.  Rather, it only waived the government’s immunity
against claims for pecuniary damages.
In Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc.,94 the Court unanimously
held that a provision of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures
Act (12 U.S.C. § 2607(b)) bars a settlement-service provider
from giving or accepting a portion of a settlement-service
charge to a different person or entity that did nothing to earn
the payment, but it does not bar a settlement-service provider
from itself collecting unearned fees from clients.  The Court
reserved judgment on whether fees paid by borrowers to
obtain lower interest rates are settlement-service charges
within the meaning of the statute.
In Golan v. Holder,95 the Court held that Congress acted
within the constraints of the Copyright Clause and the First
Amendment when it granted copyright protection to previ-
ously created works that had already entered the public
domain.
In Holder v. Martinez-Gutierrez,96 the Court unanimously
accepted as reasonable the Board of Immigration Appeals’ con-
clusion that the Attorney General cannot cancel an alien child’s
removal from the United States unless the child himself or her-
self satisfies the statute’s residency requirements for such can-
cellation.  The parents’ years of residency within the United
States cannot be imputed to the child.
In Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories,97
the Court denied patent protection to a company that had
done little more than identify a correlation between (1) the
quantity of a person’s natural production of certain metabolites
in response to taking thiopurine drugs to treat autoimmune
diseases and (2) the likelihood that the person’s dosage would
be either ineffectively low or harmfully high. In seeking patent
protection, the Court found, the company had merely
described natural laws, rather than set forth a unique way to
apply them.
In PPL Montana v. Montana,98 the Court clarified the test by
which courts and others are to determine whether states hold
title to particular riverbeds.  PPL operated numerous hydro-
electric facilities on three rivers in Montana.  Montana con-
tended that it held title to the full length of any river’s bed
within the state’s borders, so long as much (even if not all) of
that river was navigable at the time Montana acquired state-
hood in 1889.  The state thus claimed that it could charge PPL
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rent.  In PPL’s view, however, a segment-by-segment analysis
was required, with the federal government continuing to hold
title to the riverbeds in those particular areas that were not
navigable in 1889.  Drawing from English common law, a line
of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Supreme Court rulings,
and a wealth of historical research about the exploration of
American rivers, the Court unanimously sided with PPL.
In Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd.,99 the Court held
that 28 U.S.C. § 1920(6), which authorizes federal courts to
award a prevailing party costs for “compensation of inter-
preters,” only covers costs for oral translations, and not costs
for translating written documents.  “Based on our survey of
the relevant dictionaries,” Justice Alito wrote for six members
of the Court, “we conclude that the ordinary or common
meaning of ‘interpreter’ does not include those who translate
writings.”100
In United States v. Home Concrete Supply,101 the Court held
that the ordinary three-year statute of limitations (rather than
a more narrowly available six-year statute of limitations)
applies to efforts by the federal government to collect unpaid
income taxes resulting from taxpayers’ overstatement of their
basis in sold property.  The statute providing a six-year limita-
tions period applies only when (among other things) a tax-
payer “omits from gross income an amount properly included
therein.”102 By a 5-4 vote, the Court found that the word
“omits” denotes leaving something unmentioned, and thus
does not include instances when a taxpayer inflates his or her
basis in property.
LOOKING AHEAD
At the time of this writing, the Court is slated to hear a
number of attention-worthy civil cases during the 2012-2013
Term.  The case likely to draw the most press is Fisher v.
University of Texas,103 in which the Court will take a close look
at the University of Texas’s race-conscious undergraduate
admissions policy.  Other pending cases of broad interest to the
legal profession will address whether Congress exceeded its
constitutional authority when it reauthorized Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act,104 a state’s effort to require proof of citizen-
ship by individuals attempting to register to vote,105 employers’
vicarious liability under Title VII for harassment committed by
supervisors,106 corporations’ civil tort liability under the Alien
Tort Statute,107 whether a state may deny citizens of other
states the same right of access to public records that it affords
to its own citiens,108 the United States’ liability for damages
resulting from its own violations of the Fair Credit Reporting
Act,109 the threshold at which periodic flooding becomes a
compensable taking under the Takings Clause,110 whether
courts owe any measure of deference to a federal agency’s
determination of its own statutory jurisdiction,111 the circum-
stances in which a case becomes moot as a result of defendants’
settlement offers,112 whether attorneys can use personal infor-
mation obtained from a state’s department of motor vehicles to
identify possible clients,113 the reach of the Clean Water Act
and the modes by which citizens can enforce that legislation,114
the application of copyright law’s first-sale doctrine to copies
acquired abroad and imported into the United States,115 issues
relating to patent exhaustion and self-replicating technolo-
gies,116 employees’ plan-reimbursement obligations under
ERISA,117 and various issues relating to class actions.118
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The United States jury system is unique in the world in thefrequency of its use and its symbolic significance as ademocratic institution.1 As Neil Vidmar writes, the
American jury “remains a strong and vibrant institution even
as it suffers criticism and calls for reform.”2 If the jury is “the
lamp that shows that freedom lives,”3 it is ironic that so little
is known about what impact the jury system as a democratic
institution has on the citizenry who serve as jurors.
Improving our understanding of the jury’s impact is vital, as
many nations may choose to adopt or reject the jury based
partly on beliefs about how jury service shapes the civic beliefs
and actions of citizen-jurors. In particular, legal scholars Kent
Anderson and Mark Nolan point out that the proponents of
Japan’s new “quasi-jury” system marshaled two arguments in
favor of greater public participation in the Japanese legal sys-
tem—better and equitable legal outcomes4 and “the belief that
it promotes a more democratic society.”5
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gradually built the “public-discussion model” that emerged in
the United States in the 20th century (and persists to this day).
For nearly a century, that cultural model has shaped how peo-
ple talk and think about group problem solving in the U.S. 
In a similar way, the cultural-institutional legacy of jury ser-
vice may be public confidence in jury deliberation itself, as
well as in the judges who oversee the process. Thus, we theo-
rize that jury service promotes public support for the larger
legal process in which citizens participate as jurors. If true, this
finding would have tremendous significance for other
nations—including Japan, Taiwan, and Mexico—that are con-
sidering implementing the all-citizen jury system, because the
reforms they implement could be expected to bolster public
faith and confidence in the legal system itself.7
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We begin this essay by offering a more complete justifica-
tion for our project. In doing so, we explain why legal scholars
and reformers should take note of the attitudinal impact of
jury service. Next, we elaborate on the theoretical justification
for predicting attitudinal changes resulting from jury service,
and we review past research that bears on this question. After
stating specific hypotheses, we test our claims using a longitu-
dinal survey of jurors from a large county in the northwestern
United States. After reviewing the results, we discuss their
implications for jury reform in Asia and elsewhere.
THE IMPORTANCE OF JUROR ATTITUDE CHANGE
It is important to know about the impact of juror service on
jurors’ attitudes for four reasons. First, in jurisdictions such as
the U.S., where jurors are relatively free to discuss their expe-
rience as jurors—as the jurors in the Michael Jackson child-
molestation trial promptly did following the verdict8—it is
likely that many comments about the specific and general
impact of jury service will be readily expressed in the posttrial
media and that the jurors’ opinions will carry both symbolic
and educational meanings about the importance of jury service
and civic responsibilities.
Second, in many jurisdictions that tolerate a reasonably
wide range of exemptions from jury service, many jurors
become repeat players in the system, and their legal and polit-
ical attitudes may be shaped by repeated experience of jury ser-
vice. Given the fact that nearly one million Americans partici-
pate in jury trials annually,9 there are large numbers of repeated
jury players, influencing their sense of civic responsibility and
governmental legitimacy as well as their interest in future civic
participation.10
A third important reason for measuring distal effects of jury
service is that, like personal interactions with the police, jury
service offers a potentially positive experience of firsthand,
engaging, and personal contact with of the legal system.
Measuring the impact of this experience on a wide range of
beliefs and attitudes will give a more sensitive indication of
public confidence in the courts, the judiciary, and the political
system than may any generic opinion poll.
Finally, an Australian jury commissioner who manages jury
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trials in the State of Victoria has
pointed out that even reluctant
jurors can become the court’s
strongest “ambassadors” for the
political system.11 For example,
in an Australian study of jurors’
reactions to prejudicial trial pub-
licity, real jurors expressed dis-
dain for ill-informed comments
made by media representatives
who were not involved as deci-
sion makers in the trial.12 This
form of ownership over the integrity of the trial process trans-
lated not only into a willingness of jurors to defend the trial
system but also into their being relatively immune from the
negative effects of prejudicial publicity. Further research by
Benesh and Howell13 compared the perceived confidence in the
courts of jurors and defendants, suggesting that it is not so
much an acquired ownership of the court process that
increases institutional confidence but that it is the low-stakes
nature of the experience of jurors, in addition to some level of
control over the experience, that increases jurors’ confidence
in jury trials in lower courts. Social commentators, policy mak-
ers, and political strategists alike should be interested in know-
ing more about how and why we create and release ambas-
sadors with such pride in the legal system, and the political
system that supports it, following a period of jury service.
THEORIZING THE ATTITUDINAL IMPACT OF JURY
SERVICE
It cannot be taken for granted, however, that jury service has
a positive impact on attitudes toward the legal system. After all,
mock-jury literature and many anecdotal reports from real
jurors highlight both positive and negative consequences of jury
service.14 The negative stories range from juror complaints
about their treatment to empirical measurements of jurors’ poor
understanding of judicial instructions15 to the need for thera-
pists to counsel jurors who suffer negative clinical conditions
such as depression and post-traumatic stress disorder following
participation in jury trials.16 As if the need for post-juror-service
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17. David A. Bright & Jane Goodman-Delahunty, The Influence of
Gruesome Verbal Evidence on Mock Juror Verdicts, 11 PSYCHIATRY
PSYCHOL. & L. 154 (2004). See also Saul M. Kassin & David A.
Garfield, Blood and Guts: General and Trial-Specific Effects of
Videotaped Crime Scenes on Mock Jurors, 21 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1459 (1991).
18. The major exception is the book related to the research in this arti-
cle. See JOHN GASTIL, E. PIERRE DEESS, PHILIP J. WEISER, & CINDY
SIMMONS, THE JURY AND DEMOCRACY: HOW JURY DELIBERATION
PROMOTES CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATIOn (2010).
19. Masahiro Fujita, Can Japanese Citizens Play Active Roles in
“Saiban-in Seido”? Survey Research with Mock Mixed Juries,
Poster Presented at the Psychology and Law International,
Interdisciplinary Conference (July 7-12, 2003); Anderson &
Nolan, supra note 5; Hiroshi Fukurai, Japan’s Quasi-Jury and
Grand Jury Systems as Deliberative Agents of Social Change: De-
Colonial Strategies and Deliberative Participatory Democracy, 86
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 789 (2011).
20. The law for the Prosecutorial Review Commission was originally
created in 1948 during the Allied Occupation of Japan that fol-
lowed World War II. Because of the Allied influence, the PRC
became a hybrid institution resulting from the adaptation of the
American civil and criminal grand-jury systems into the Japanese
cultural and legal context. After group deliberations on each case,
the commission submits one of the following three recommenda-
tions: (1) non-indictment is proper, (2) non-indictment is
improper, and (3) indictment is proper. A majority vote is needed
for the first two options, while the special majority with at least
eight votes is needed for the third option. See Hiroshi Fukurai,
Japan’s Prosecutorial Review Commissions: Lay Oversight of the
Government’s Discretion of Prosecution, 6 E. ASIA L. REV. 1 (2011).
21. Fukurai, supra note 7, at 336, table 1.
22. Id. at 342.
23. GASTIL ET AL., supra note 18, at 32-39.
24. Id. at 39-49.
counseling was not concerning
enough, some mock-trial
research highlights a link
between gruesome evidence and
conviction-prone juries, even
when exculpatory evidence is
held constant across gruesome-
versus-non-gruesome evidence
conditions in mock trials.17
EVIDENCE FROM JAPAN
There is not yet direct evidence of jury service having posi-
tive attitudinal effects on individual jurors’ views of courts and
other public institutions,18 but there is indirect evidence to
that effect. As mentioned above, the socio-political climate sur-
rounding the reintroduction of a criminal jury to Japan has
been rich with opinion polls, mock trials, and concerns over
the impact of the jury system on jurors. Preliminary mock-trial
research in Japan suggests that willingness to be involved in
the Japanese jury system may increase after jury service, beg-
ging the question of whether this, in turn, may have wider-
ranging attitudinal effects and social-belief changes of the type
anticipated by the architects of the new Japanese jury.19
Other research conducted in Japan has also produced evi-
dence of how lay participation in the justice system can
increase public faith and confidence in the entire legal system.
Japan’s Prosecutorial Review Commission (PRC) system is
similar to that of America’s civil grand jury in that it examines
the functioning of local public offices, including the district
attorney’s office. A PRC is comprised of eleven citizens ran-
domly selected from an electoral register, is appointed to a six-
month term, and has the power to review whether or not the
disposition of non-prosecution made by public prosecutors is
appropriate.20
From September to December 2005, eleven prefectural
offices of the Japanese Prosecutorial Review Commission
Society were contacted, and their members were asked to fill
out additional questionnaires (23% of 47 PRC prefectural
offices in Japan). The study found that PRC members were
more willing to serve on quasi-juries, were less concerned
about obstacles to serving on juries, and had more confidence
in the system of popular legal participation. Further, the civic
legal experience helped lay citizens develop greater confidence
in their capacity to make a fair and just decision, and they were
less concerned about a threat of possible retaliation from
defendants in criminal trials. Almost all of the PRC members
indicated that their PRC experience was positive (99%), and
the great majority of them indicated that they were willing to
serve again (94%).21 PRC members showed a high level of con-
fidence in the system of government and justice administra-
tion, including criminal justice managers such as judges, pros-
ecutors, defense attorneys, police, and jurors. However, the
study also found that the importance of quasi-jury duty has
not been widely advocated, and the system of civilian legal par-
ticipation, including the PRC, still remained relatively
unknown in Japanese communities.22
EVIDENCE FROM THE U.S.
In addition, a pair of studies have examined how jury ser-
vice is linked to voting in the U.S. The initial study looked at
a single locale—Thurston County, Washington.23 Working
with many research colleagues, the first author of this essay
collected court and voting records for a period of years and
merged them by matching jurors’ full names with unique
records in the voter database. This study found, after control-
ling for other trial features and past voting frequency, that cit-
izens who served on a criminal jury that reached a verdict were
more likely to vote in subsequent elections than were those
jurors who deadlocked, were dismissed during trial, or served
as alternates. The effect was augmented by the number of
charges against the defendant, with trials including more
charges yielding greater increases in jurors’ voting rates. 
An extensive follow-up of jurors from jurisdictions across
the United States yielded two related findings.24 First, in-depth
interviews with a small sample of jurors revealed that citizens
typically recognize jury service as a basic civic duty, and two-
thirds, without further prompting, compared it to voting. In
other words, jurors drew a cognitive connection between jury
service and voting. Second, another dataset gathered from
Colorado, Louisiana, Nebraska, North Carolina, Ohio, and
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26. These comparisons were made using dummy codings that treated
the unused jurors as the “reference group.” The choice of refer-
ence group is somewhat arbitrary, but the reasoning for this
arrangement was to highlight the contrast between jurors and
non-jurors, with a secondary test of whether the non-jurors were
different from the control group. See JACOB COHEN ET AL., APPLIED
MULTIPLE REGRESSION/CORRELATION ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCES 312-17 (3d ed. 2003).
27. Confidence ratings were given using a five-point scale from “very
low” to “very high.” Respondents rated the following institutions:
“U.S. Congress,” “U.S. Supreme Court,” “State and local judges,”
and “the jury system.” In addition, respondents used a four-point
scale (1 = Strongly disagree; 2 = Disagree; 3 = Agree; 4 = Strongly
agree) to state their views on these two items: “The criminal jury
system is the fairest way to determine the guilt or innocence of a
person accused of a crime,” and, “The civil jury system is a good
way to settle many civil lawsuits.”
28. Also, because jurors were recruited for this study over a period of
five months, there was considerable variance in lag time between
Wave 1 and Wave 2 surveys across participants (average lag time
was 221 days (SD = 47)). This permitted testing for a potential lag
effect—with attitude changes either weakening or strengthening
over time. For this purpose, the same regression equations shown
Washington25 found the similar pattern of increasing voting
rates, except that this larger dataset revealed that the critical
distinction was between those who deliberated (including hung
juries) and those who did not. Once again, the number of
criminal charges against the defendant had an additional, sig-
nificant effect on post-service voting rates. This analysis also
found that the increased voting effects were apparent only for
previously infrequent voters (voting less than 50% of the time)
who served on criminal trials. Frequent voters and all of those
who served on civil juries did not have a significant increase in
voting after deliberative experience in jury trials.
HYPOTHESES AND RESEARCH DESIGN
Based on findings such as these, we came to believe it likely
that popular legal participation can significantly alter individ-
ual jurors’ perceptions of the jury system, as well as of other
courts and judges and even other branches of government. We
tested these hypotheses by interviewing jurors before and sev-
eral months after serving on fully empanelled juries to see if
their attitudes and opinions changed. By way of comparison,
we also collected data on people who reported for jury service
but never sat on a jury, as well as a control group of voters
drawn from the same jurisdiction who were not summoned to
jury service. 
Though we will spare the reader the statistical details, if one
wishes to know the analytic technique, we used a regression
analysis to test the hypothesis that serving on a jury (versus
reporting for service but not being seated on a jury) predicted
post-service attitudes even after taking into account a wide
range of “statistical controls,” including demographics and
background variables, along with the corresponding pre-jury-
service attitudes. We also expected no statistically significant
difference between our un-summoned control group of regis-
tered voters and those who reported for jury service but never
sat in the jury box. Finally, we predicted that the effect of jury
service, including jurors’ deliberative experience, is strongest
the first time one serves on a jury; thus, after conducting our
main analyses, we split the sample to test whether the effects of
jury service are consistent for both first-time and veteran jurors.
DATA-COLLECTION METHOD
This study focused on three different samples, each from
King County, Washington: people summoned to jury service
who did not sit on a jury, a.k.a. “non-jurors” (N = 1,579),
empanelled jurors (N = 1,088), and voters never called to jury
duty (N = 205).26 All jurors reported for jury service at the
King County Courthouse, the
Kent Regional Justice Center,
and the Seattle Municipal
Court. Seventy-nine percent of
these jurors served on criminal
trials, ranging from murder to
misdemeanors, with the
remainder sitting in an equally
diverse set of civil trials.
The surveys used in this
study were conducted at two
points in time. The Wave 1
juror survey was administered
via pen-and-paper surveys dur-
ing the initial jury-orientation
period (February to July 2004), before the jurors were called to
a courtroom for jury service. This Wave 1 juror survey yielded
a response rate of 78% (with a cooperation rate of approxi-
mately 81%, as 4% of those reporting to service were sent to
courtrooms before research staff could administer the survey).
All empanelled jurors (and a subsample of those reporting but
never empanelled) were then re-contacted online and by mail
to complete Wave 2 from November to December 2004
(response rate = 73%).
The voter group followed a parallel schedule for the two
data-collection periods but was assembled in a different man-
ner. A random sample of registered voters was extracted from
a January 2004 copy of the King County voter database, and
these individuals received their surveys by mail. The response
rate for Wave 1 was 20% (N = 270), with 79% of the Wave 1
respondents also completing the Wave 2 survey (N = 205). To
augment the Wave 2 control group, a replacement sample was
also drawn from the same voter database, and it had a response
rate of 20% (N = 134).
The Wave 1 survey included six items measuring attitudes
toward the jury, judges, and other public institutions.27
Additional items measured previous experience with jury ser-
vice and a broad range of control variables (sex, age, educa-
tion, employment, political knowledge, etc.). The Wave 2 sur-
vey repeated the attitude items and also measured partisan-
ship, a variable the King County judges were reluctant to mea-
sure immediately prior to jury service. The Wave 1 and Wave
2 measures were spaced a minimum of four months apart to
ensure that we captured long-term attitude changes, as
opposed to those that might fade a few days or weeks after
jury service.28
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Once again, for the sake of
simplicity, we present the main
results of our analyses without
burying our findings in the
details of our statistical regres-
sion analyses.29 To clear away
some underbrush, let us note
that across all our analyses, the
non-juror-versus-voter contrast
never reached significance. In
other words, there was no evi-
dence that reporting for jury
service without sitting on a jury
changed anyone’s attitudes
beyond the same shifts that occurred in the general voting pop-
ulation during the same period. 
By contrast, there were important and statistically signifi-
cant differences in attitude changes between jurors and non-
jurors for three of the six attitude measures. Relative to non-
jurors, jurors became more confident in the jury system, per-
ceived greater criminal-jury fairness, and developed more con-
fidence in state and local judges.30 They did not, however, dif-
fer from non-jurors in their ratings of the quality of the civil
jury nor in their confidence in the U.S. Supreme Court or U.S.
Congress.
Though the correlations of statistical controls with the atti-
tude measures were not the central focus of this study, it is
worthwhile to note one particular set of findings. The same
three attitude measures on which jury service failed to yield
changes were the only ones on which the Conservative ideo-
logical measure had a significant independent effect. Relative
to their more liberal/Democratic peers, Conservative/
Republican respondents lost some confidence in the quality of
civil juries but gained confidence in the U.S. Supreme Court
and U.S. Congress.31 To observers of American politics, these
findings are no surprise, as this study coincided with the 2004
election year, in which the conservative Republican Party
sought to keep control of Congress and the Presidency, as well
as to solidify its influence over the U.S. Supreme Court. At the
same time, Republicans continued an ongoing campaign to
plead for “tort reform,” claiming that civil lawyers and juries
alike were unfriendly to business.32
Finally, we investigated the possibility that the main atti-
tude changes demonstrated in the contrast between empan-
elled jurors and voters might have occurred primarily for
those people serving on a jury for the first time. To test this
hypothesis, we split the juror sample into two halves—one
group having sat on one or more juries in the past (a.k.a. “vet-
erans”) and the other being assigned to a jury for the first time
during their present appearance at the courthouse. The same
six regression equations were then run for each of the two
samples.
Using this approach, we found that the change in overall
confidence in the jury system was roughly equivalent for first-
time jurors.33 On the other hand, first-time jurors ended up
with increases in the perceived fairness of the criminal jury and
heightened confidence in state and local judges, whereas the
corresponding attitudes did not show statistical change for the
veteran jurors.34 In sum, the results supported the hypothesis
by showing that first-time jurors experience greater attitude
change as a result of their service relative to veteran jurors.
Table 1 summarizes these and the other main findings of our
study.
It is worth adding a note about the size of the effects
128 Court Review - Volume 48 
below were also run with this lag measure entered as a main effect
and an interactive term with jury service, but neither produced
significant coefficients. In other words, the results shown below
were consistent regardless of the number of months that elapsed
between the completion of one’s jury service and the follow-up
survey. 
29. When assessing longitudinal attitude change with panel data, one
approach is to treat the Wave 2 measure as the dependent variable
and use the Wave 1 measure as a control. STEVEN E. FINKEL, CAUSAL
ANALYSIS WITH PANEL DATA (1995). Using this approach, a compara-
ble regression equation was calculated for each of the five Wave 1-
2 attitude measures, with each equation estimating the effect of
jury service on a Wave 2 attitude after controlling for the Wave 1
attitude, plus the full set of control variables in the dataset.
30. Semi-partial correlations for these effects were sr = .083 (p < .01),
.036 (p < .05), and .055 (p < .01), respectively.
31. Semi-partial correlations were sr = -.052, .044, and .166, respec-
tively (all p < .01).
32. Peter H. Stone, Trial Lawyers on Trial, 35 NAT’L J. 2250 (2003). For
a contrary view of the evidence, see VALERIE P. HANS, BUSINESS ON
TRIAL: THE CIVIL JURY AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY (2000).
33. Semi-partial correlations were sr = .86 for first-time jurors and sr
= .72 for veterans (both p < .01).
34. For first-time jurors, sr = .44 (p < .05) for perceived fairness of
criminal jury and sr = .75 (p < .01) for confidence in state and
local judges.
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TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS 
FROM STATISTICAL ANALYSES
OVERALL JURY-BOX
EFFECT VERSUS 
REGISTERED VOTERS
IMPACT ON THOSE
WITH NO PRIOR
JURY EXPERIENCE
IMPACT ON THOSE
WHO HAD 
RENDERED 
VERDICTS BEFORE
OVERALL 
CONFIDENCE IN 
JURY SYSTEM
+ + +
PERCEIVED FAIRNESS
OF CRIMINAL JURY + + o
PERCEIVED QUALITY
OF CIVIL JURY o o o
CONFIDENCE IN
STATE/LOCAL 
JUDGES
+ + o
CONFIDENCE IN U.S.
SUPREME COURT o o o
CONFIDENCE IN U.S.
CONGRESS o o o
MINIMUM SAMPLE
SIZE (N) 2,665 1,783 882
35. Effect-size terminology conventions come from JACOB COHEN,
STATISTICAL POWER ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES (2d ed.
1988).
36. Deborah A. Prentice & Dale T. Miller, When Small Effects Are
Impressive, 112 PSYCHOL. BULL. 160 (1992).
37. The comparison here is with the 2003-2004 presidential campaign
designed to dampen public support for the civil jury, as discussed
in note 32.
38. See Hiroshi Fukurai, Kay-Wah Chan, & Setsuo Miyazawa,
Introduction to the Special Issue: The Future of Lay Adjudication and
Theorizing Today’s Resurgence of Civic, Legal Participatory Systems
in East and Central Asia, 38 INT’L J.L. CRIME & JUST. 141, 143-45
(2010).
39. Kent Anderson & Emma Saint, Japan’s Quasi-Jury (Saiban-in) Law:
An Annotated Translation of the Act Concerning Participation of Lay
Assessors in Criminal Trials, 6 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 233, 283
(2005) (emphasis added).
40. The use of all-white juries from the pre-Civil War to the anti-war
and civil-rights movements in the late 1960s provides another
example of the social control of the lay participatory system in
making legal decisions. See HIROSHI FUKURAI & RICHARD KROOTH,
RACE IN THE JURY BOX: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN JURY SELECTION.
observed. All of the effects reported herein are “small” ones,35
and one might ask whether these attitudinal changes, though
detectable, may ever lead to widespread societal impact. First
of all, as a matter of principle, it is important to remember that
small statistical effect sizes can be illusory in that they may still
reflect considerable cognitive and behavioral change. This case
may meet Prentice and Miller’s criteria for a small effect being
impressive,36 since the relatively brief experience of jury ser-
vice on a single case still managed to create long-term change
in relatively stable attitudes about all juries and judges. In
technical terms, a small manipulation of the independent vari-
able caused substantial change in a difficult-to-influence
dependent variable. 
Second, it appears that a few days of jury service can pro-
duce attitude changes comparable in effect size to those yielded
by a full-throttle national presidential campaign.37 The results of
this study suggest that the jury experience may be unable to
generate such changes when the attitude-object is also the
focus of intense partisan debate, but the fact remains that jury
service’s effect on overall confidence in the jury, trust in crim-
inal juries, and confidence in state and local judges was com-
parable to the observed effects of conservative partisanship or
ideology on attitudes toward the civil jury and the U.S.
Supreme Court during the same time period.
CONCLUSION
This study found evidence of persistent, long-term (greater
than four months) attitude change flowing from juror service,
particularly for those people serving for the first time. Many of
the empanelled jurors in our sample became more confident in
the jury system, perceived the criminal jury to be fairer, and
indicated a greater confidence in state and local court judges
than they did before serving, and those changes contrasted with
the experience of those who had not served on juries as well as
those registered voters who had not even been called to serve. 
Given the significant impact of civic legal participation on
the development of civic confidence in the criminal justice sys-
tem, many countries in the world are currently trying to create
or have recently reinstituted their own system of lay participa-
tion in law. Bodies ranging from mixed tribunals to all-citizen
juries have been implemented or debated in Japan, South
Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and the People’s Republic of China in
East Asia; Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Ukraine, and
Latvia in the former Soviet Union; and Venezuela and
Argentina in South America, among many others.38
Similarly, in Japan a new quasi-jury system has been created
specifically relying on a rationale confirmed by the results seen
in this project. The quasi-
jury system, or saiban-in
seido, was enacted in 2004
and began quasi-jury trials
in 2009. The system is a
hybrid, jury-mixed court
where a judicial panel of
three professional and six
lay judges decide both guilt
and sentence in serious
criminal cases. Japan’s
expectation was made
expressly in the legislation,
which provided the legislative rationale for the new quasi-jury
system, stating, “In light of the fact that having lay assessors
selected from among the people participating along with
judges in the criminal litigation process will contribute to rais-
ing the public’s trust in and increasing their understanding of the
judicial system, it is necessary to . . . achieve lay assessors’ par-
ticipation in criminal trials.”39 The results obtained in this
study suggest that Japan’s quasi-jury system may reap some of
the very rewards its proponents imagined. 
Lest this sound too optimistic, we acknowledge that there is
also a history of juries being abused by those in political power,
and those proposing the introduction of the jury abroad should
be aware of that danger. In the first half of the 20th century, for
example, the judicial system of civic participation had been
converted into a weapon of oppression by totalitarian political
regimes, such as the Bolsheviks’ mixed courts with Communist
Party assessors, the Nazi Volksgerichten with Nazi Party asses-
sors, and the Popular Tribunals during the Spanish Civil War.40
The modern U.S. jury has overcome or mitigated many of
its shortcomings, but to maintain its independence from polit-
ical abuse and corruption, the institution of the jury must base
its foundation on egalitarian and representative principles of
democracy. Our analysis suggests that politically partisan
beliefs exerted significant influence in shaping opinions and
attitudes toward jury duty and participation. One of the most
important rationales for the institution of lay participation in
governance is that it provides an important check on political
and judicial power, particularly in societies with clear ideolog-
ical divisions in which judges often belong to the dominant
political group. Hopefully, the establishment of new systems of
civic legal participation in many nations can ensure energetic
participation from their diverse populations, thereby preserv-
ing the democratic character and principles of their larger
political systems.
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Footnotes 
1. Trial transcript cites are from: Trial Transcript, 182, State of New
Jersey v. McKinley Cromedy, Ind. No. 1243- 07-93 (N.J. Super. Ct.
July 27, 1994) (on file with the author).  A discussion of this case
and a more detailed discussion of eyewitness misidentifications
and postconviction rulings in the first 250 DNA-exoneration cases
appears in my book. See BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE
INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG (2011).
2. State v. Cromedy, 727 A.2d 457 (N.J. 1999).
3. I have made the data from these 250 exoneree cases and appen-
dices to the book available online at a resource webpage:
http://www.law.virginia.edu/html/librarysite/garrett_innocent.htm.
“[T]he evidence will show, not that she’s a liar, but that she’s
mistaken, that her identification is wrong and it’s a misidenti-
fication,” McKinley Cromedy’s defense lawyer told the jury in
the opening statement.1
The victim, a white college student, had been raped by a
black man in her apartment. A few days later, she had helped
a police artist draw a composite sketch of a black man with a
full face and a moustache.  She looked at thousands of pho-
tos of black men who had been arrested. One of those photos
was of Cromedy.  In fact, the police had him in mind as a sus-
pect because he had been seen in the area, but she did not
identify him.
Almost eight months later, she saw Cromedy crossing the
street. She thought he was her attacker, partly because of his
appearance but also because of his unusual way of walking due
to a limp, “a swagger,” as she put it. She called the police, who
called her back fifteen minutes later to say that they had picked
up a man matching her description. She then went to the
police station, where police asked her to identify Cromedy,
standing in a room behind one-way glass.  She positively iden-
tified Cromedy as her attacker. 
The police officer explained, “I’ve had a lot of experience
with identifications and I’m not going to lead somebody. I
asked her to see if she recognized this person.” Yet there was
no justification for conducting an inherently suggestive
showup in which she viewed Cromedy one-on-one, rather
than conduct a lineup.
Cromedy’s lawyer argued that the identification was
improper, saying that the showup was “like true or false, and
to me that is about as suggestive as a procedure you can have.
. . . She knows somebody was picked up. What could be more
suggestive?” 
The trial judge ruled that the identification was admissible,
emphasizing, “she was very certain of her identification,” and
noting that her composite drawing looked like Cromedy and
that “Mr. Cromedy has a very, very unique style of walking. It’s
a combination of a swagger and a roll.” 
At trial, the victim pointed to Cromedy in the courtroom
and agreed she was “absolutely sure” he was her attacker.
Cromedy’s defense lawyer then asked for a special jury
instruction, asking the jury to consider “whether the cross-
racial nature of the identification has affected the accuracy of
the witness’s original perception and/or accuracy of a subse-
quent identification.” The trial judge denied the request. 
Cromedy was convicted. On appeal, though, the New Jersey
Supreme Court reversed his conviction. The court ruled in
1999 that “forty years” of empirical studies documented a risk
of heightened error when white eyewitnesses try to identify
black subjects. The court noted that some courts, such as in
California, Massachusetts, and Utah, had permitted such
instructions. The court ruled that under the facts of his case, it
was “reversible error not to have given an instruction that
informed the jury about the possible significance of the cross-
racial identification factor, a factor the jury can observe in
many cases with its own eyes.”2
The court reversed McKinley Cromedy’s conviction without
knowing that he was in fact innocent. After the ruling, how-
ever, the prosecution agreed to conduct DNA tests. The results
excluded him and he was exonerated. The victim later com-
mented, “I couldn’t believe that I was wrong.”
CONVICTING THE INNOCENT
In my book, Convicting the Innocent, published in 2011 by
Harvard University Press, I examined the cases of the first 250
people exonerated by postconviction DNA testing.  With some
difficulty, by contacting lawyers, court clerks, and court
reporters around the country, I assembled the original trial
records from their cases.  I was able to obtain 88% of their trial
transcripts  (207 trial transcripts from the 234 that had a trial),
as well as materials from hearings for 11 of the 16 who had
pleaded guilty.3 I wanted to know what went wrong.  Why
were these people convicted?  
When I examined the records, I learned that cases like
Cromedy’s were not idiosyncratic.  In fact, cases like his were
quite typical.  Most DNA exonerees had eyewitnesses evidence
at their trials, since so many of the cases involving DNA post-
conviction were rape cases.  Thus, 76% had eyewitnesses
misidentify them (190 of 250 exonerees).  More to the point,
eyewitnesses typically described how police used suggestive
procedures, like the showup used in Cromedy’s case.  All but a
handful of the eyewitnesses were certain at the time of trial.
An eyewitness in Steven Avery’s case testified, “[T]here is
absolutely no question in my mind.” In Thomas Doswell’s case,
the victim testified, “This is the man or it is his twin brother”
and “That is one face I will never forget . . . .” In Dean Cage’s
case, the victim was “a hundred percent sure.” In Willie Otis
“Pete” Williams’s case, the victim said she was “one hundred
and twenty” percent sure. 
Cromedy was one of 74 black or Hispanic exonerees
misidentified by a white eyewitness, and almost half of the
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identifications were cross-racial.  As the New Jersey Supreme
Court noted, studies have long shown how cross-racial identi-
fications are especially error-prone.  
Decades of social science can tell us much more about what
went wrong in Cromedy’s case.  Not only was he convicted
based on a cross-racial identification, but as discussed, police
used a suggestive showup identification. The eyewitness had
earlier seen Cromedy’s picture but had been unable to identify
him.  Yet her confidence had increased by the time of trial,
when she was absolutely sure, though she was wrong.  I saw
exactly the same pattern in other cases of people later cleared
by DNA tests.  Just as social scientists would have predicted
based on upwards of 2,000 studies, as well as meta-analyses
and field studies, suggestive lineup procedures can cement
eyewitness mistakes.  Almost without exception, the eyewit-
nesses who misidentified innocent people were completely
confident at trial, though they were wrong.  Most had earlier
been uncertain, when first shown the defendant’s photo at an
array, or seeing the defendant at a lineup.  In 57% of the trials
studied (92 of 161 cases), witnesses reported they had not
been certain at the earlier identifications, or identified other
people.  
Where did that false confidence come from? In 78% of those
trials (125 of the 161 cases involving eyewitnesses in which
trial records could be located), there was evidence that police
contaminated the identifications. Many of those eyewitnesses
were asked to pick out the suspect using suggestive methods
long known to increase risks of error. Police made remarks that
indicated who should be selected, used unnecessary showups,
or used lineups that made the defendant stand out. 
NEW JERSEY’S RESPONSE 
In response to such exonerations, New Jersey began a pro-
ject of revamping its criminal-procedure rules. The New Jersey
Attorney General’s Office issued guidelines to all law-enforce-
ment agencies in the state requiring that detailed procedures
be followed when eyewitnesses are asked to identify a suspect.4
These guidelines were a landmark reform. New Jersey became
the first state in the country to adopt double-blind lineups.
That simple reform, having an officer administer the lineup
who does not know which one is the suspect, is the most
important improvement to lineups.  Feedback from police,
even unintentional can dramatically increase the confidence of
an eyewitness, even when the eyewitness is wrong.5 It is easy
to adopt, and smaller departments that cannot spare another
administrator can easily make a lineup blind by using the
“folder method”: simply placing the photos in folders and
shuffling them, with a few blanks, so that the administrator
cannot see inside the folders
that the witness is examining.  
New Jersey adopted a second
key reform: sequential photo
arrays, showing photos one at a
time to prevent “comparison
shopping.”  More recent field
studies have shown how
sequential lineups reduce false
identifications of “fillers” in
lineups, making them an impor-
tant improvement for police,
whose witnesses lose credibility
if they identify fillers.6
Eyewitnesses were to be instructed that the perpetrator might
not appear in the lineup, along with other improvements. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court did more.  In 2006, the
court required that police similarly record or document all eye-
witness identifications.  The court noted, “Misidentification is
widely recognized as the single greatest cause of wrongful con-
victions in this country.”7 In 2007, the court addressed jury
instructions. The court adopted a Model Jury Instruction
charging all jurors not to rely on “the confidence level” of an
eyewitness, at least not “standing alone.”8
Finally, the court asked that a special master explore some-
thing more fundamental: the U.S. Supreme Court’s Manson v.
Brathwaite test9 for evaluating admissibility of eyewitness iden-
tifications.The master held hearings, with the participation of
the New Jersey Office of the Public Defender, Attorney General,
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and the Innocence
Project. He recommended that the court adopt a new test for
evaluating eyewitness identification evidence and require pre-
trial hearings to evaluate all eyewitness identifications.10
In the landmark decision of New Jersey v. Henderson,11 the
New Jersey Supreme Court adopted a comprehensive social-
science framework for evaluating eyewitness-identification
evidence. Detailed jury instructions are now required to edu-
cate jurors on the factors that affect an eyewitnesses’ memory.
While the U.S. Supreme Court in Perry v. New Hampshire
declined to further regulate eyewitness identifications, albeit in
a case with marginal facts involving an identification not
“arranged” by police, reform is now occurring in the states.12
Most recently, the Oregon Supreme Court in Oregon v. Lawson13
abandoned the Manson test and recommended careful exam-
iniation of factors informed by social science. As I describe in
my book, Convicting the Innocent, other states have enacted
statutes to improve lineup procedures or have adopted detailed
model policies for police departments to follow.  
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New Jersey now provides a
leading model for the coun-
try, beginning with improving
the lineups themselves, but
extending to how judges can
ensure that more accurate
identification evidence is pre-
sented in their courtrooms—
and it all began with the terri-
ble lesson learned from the
case of McKinley Cromedy.
HARMLESS ERROR 
One of the central questions that I posed when examining
the cases of these innocent people was this:  Why was it so hard
for innocent people to challenge their flawed convictions?  I did
not just study trials, but also all of the claims that exonerees
asserted postconviction before they obtained the DNA tests that
ultimately led to the vacatur of their convictions.
One of the most difficult tasks of a judge is deciding which
mistakes matter and which do not.  Legendary California
Supreme Court Chief Judge Roger Traynor poetically described
the plight of the appellate or postconviction judge confronted
by thousands and thousands of claims of trial errors: 
Errors are the insects in the world of law, traveling
through it in swarms, often unnoticed in their endless
procession. Many are plainly harmless; some appear omi-
nously harmful. Some, for all the benign appearance of
their spindly traces, mark the way for a plague of follow-
ers that deplete trials of fairness.14
The cases brought by DNA exonerees, who we now know to
have been innocent, provided me with a unique opportunity to
examine how judges sort out harmful errors from the harm-
less. When I reviewed the records in these unusual cases of
DNA exonerees, I asked myself why the judges hearing these
cases on appeal or habeas review did not correct these errors,
long before DNA testing entered the picture. 
Of course, asking that the question assumes that these peo-
ple could somehow show a judge that they were innocent even
without getting DNA testing. But at a more fundamental level,
the question assumes that after a conviction, higher courts will
review the trial record and look for mistakes, to make sure that
a miscarriage of justice did not occur.  That second assumption
is not a very good one. Judge Jerome Frank and Barbara Frank,
in their 1957 book about wrongful convictions, called the
notion that the court on appeal will correct the mistaken con-
viction of the innocent the “Upper Court Myth.” They pointed
out that the appellate court “knows no more than the jury and
the trial judge” and has a limited role. It is “obliged to accept
the jury’s verdict” and must typically accept the testimony of
the witnesses as true rather than reconsider the case based on
a cold record.15
In the decades after they wrote, a criminal-procedure revo-
lution has changed the face of appellate and postconviction lit-
igation, creating a host of new avenues to challenge a convic-
tion, but still, very few cases are ever reversed on appeal and
postconviction review—no more than 1% or 2%.  While Judge
Henry Friendly famously and provocatively asked in a 1970 law
review article why innocence is not more relevant to habeas
review, innocence remains salient mostly when denying relief
by finding error harmless;16 the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to
recognize, except hypothetically, a claim of actual innocence.
The exonerees, who in hindsight we know are actually
innocent, did earn high numbers of reversals—a 13% reversal
rate—in criminal appeals and postconviction proceedings they
brought before they obtained the DNA testing that exonerated
them. I then discovered that this 13% reversal rate was not
unusual. When I compared them to a matched group of defen-
dants with reported decisions involving similar crimes, years,
and states, I discovered that the reversal rate in these
exonerees’ cases was no different from the reversal rates of
other rape and murder trials. The implication is that rape and
murder trials may simply produce higher rates of reversible
errors. Because courts issued written decisions in about two-
thirds of the cases (165 of 250 cases, or 66%), combing
through this mass of opinions does not tell us what happened
in every case, but it can allow us to make some generalizations
about how courts judged innocence.
CHALLENGING TRIAL EVIDENCE
Cromedy’s case was unusual in that he actually challenged
the eyewitness identification in his case, and his case was
extremely unusual in that he was able to earn a reversal even
before he obtained DNA testing to prove his innocence.  Of the
124 exonerees who were convicted on the basis of an eyewit-
ness identification and obtained a judge’s written decision,
only 56% challenged the eyewitness identification (70 of 124
cases).  Only 7% were successful (5 of 70 cases). Similarly, only
32% of those who had forensic evidence at trial challenged the
forensic evidence (36 of 112 cases) and 17% succeeded (6 of
36 cases). Only 36% challenged informant testimony (16 of 45
cases) and 25% succeeded (4 of 16 cases). The largest propor-
tion, 59%, challenged false confessions (13 of 22 cases), but
only 8% had any success (just 1 of 13 cases). 
I discuss all of these cases in greater detail in my book, and
in a law-review article titled Judging Innocence.17 The cases
involving forensic evidence are troubling, where invalid foren-
sic analysis and false statistics were apparent just from reading
the trial transcripts; still worse, many of the traditional tech-
niques used at the time were invalid and unreliable.  Yet judges
rarely granted relief, failing to screen unscientific forensic tes-
timony at trial and frequently finding error harmless on appeal
or postconviction. 
Take the confession cases, for example.  One would think
that confession evidence would be central at trial and would be
a crucial subject for postconviction challenges.  However, of the
22 innocent people who were convicted based on false confes-
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sions and had written decisions in their cases, only seven raised
Fifth Amendment claims that their confessions were involun-
tary, and three more alleged their confessions were obtained in
violation of Miranda. None of these claims was successful.
The exception among the confession cases—Ronald
Williamson’s case—instead involved an ineffective-assistance-
of-counsel claim, and failures by his lawyer to challenge the
confession, but also a range of failures by his lawyer to chal-
lenge other important evidence in the case.  Indeed, before trial
his lawyer had begged the judge to let him withdraw from the
case. “I can’t represent him Judge; I just can’t do it,” his lawyer
had insisted. “I’m too damned old for it, Judge. I don’t want
anything to do with him, not under any circumstances.”
More representative of the rulings in cases involving false
confessions, the Illinois Supreme Court stated that Alejandro
Hernandez “did not present an argument which convinces us
that he learned the details of the crime contained in his ‘vision’
from law enforcement officers.”18 A series of other courts sim-
ilarly emphasized how detailed the confessions were and how
overwhelming the evidence of guilt was.  Perhaps most
remarkable was Nathaniel Hatchett’s case, in which the judge
convicted him at a bench trial—despite the fact that DNA tests
even at the time excluded him—in the case of a victim raped
by a single person.  Despite the DNA exclusion, which the
judge could not explain, the judge emphasized, “[I]n this case
there is an abundance of corroboration for the statements
made by Mr. Hatchett to the police after his arrest,” which the
judge found “to be of overwhelming importance in determin-
ing the outcome of the trial.”19 His appeal was denied by a
court similarly emphasizing how “the prosecution presented
overwhelming evidence” and how the detectives had “testified
that defendant’s statement included information that only the
perpetrator of the crimes would know,” including facts “fully
corroborative” of the victim’s account.20
Now we know that these false confessions included details
that could only have come from law enforcement.  All but two
of the 40 false confessions that I examined included such
details.  They were contaminated, but judges did not credit
those allegations, failing to believe that police would feed facts
to a compliant suspect.  Absent any complete recording of the
entire interrogations, there was no proof of who said what.
Recantations by these innocent people were disbelieved.   In
response, more and more states and police departments are
requiring videotaping of complete interrogations.  Whether
judges will do more to examine the reliability of confession
statements, however, is another question.  Judges should insist
on a completely recorded and documented interrogation and
examine “fit” and whether, although voluntary, the suspect
could in fact volunteer corroborated information about the
crime.  Otherwise, innocent people may be simply fed the facts
to make their words fit the crime.  Contamination of a confes-
sion can happen unintentionally, even, during complex inter-
rogations using psychological techniques.  Unless interroga-
tions are recorded and judges
carefully screen confessions for
reliability, seemingly “over-
whelming” evidence may con-
vict the innocent.
JUDGING GUILT
Of 165 exonerees who had
written decisions on appeal or
postconviction, harmless error-
type rulings were pervasive.  In
62% of the cases, judges commented on guilt or found error
harmless.  In 30% of the cases, judges found error harmless.  In
10% of the cases, judges called evidence of guilt “overwhelm-
ing.”   To be sure, some errors truly are harmless.  However,
what I describe in these DNA-exoneree cases is a system in
which they had little incentive to claim innocence: all who
brought innocence claims before obtaining DNA testing lost.
They had few incentives to challenge the reliability of the evi-
dence at their trials: despite clear problems with eyewitness
procedures used, outright invalid forensics (another subject of
my book, which I do not discuss here for lack of space), and
the problems described with the confessions, many did not
challenge central evidence at trial, and few had any success. 
MISSING EVIDENCE
It has come to light in a host of these exonerees’ cases that
evidence that went missing or that was concealed by law
enforcement could have supported their claims of innocence
at trial.  Violations of Brady v. Maryland may be far more com-
mon than we would like to think: I came across dozens of
cases in which exculpatory forensics had been uncovered only
after the exoneration, or the fact that eyewitnesses were hyp-
notized, or deals with informants, and other crucial evidence
of innocence.  
One high-profile case highlights the importance of ensuring
careful preservation and disclosure of evidence.  The U.S.
Supreme Court did not hear most of these DNA exonerees’
appeals or habeas petitions claims, but it did rule on 38 certio-
rari petitions filed by these innocent people. It summarily
denied each of these petitions without giving reasons, except
Larry Youngblood’s. In Youngblood’s case, the Court heard oral
arguments and issued a written opinion explaining why it
rejected his claim that he should receive a new trial because
law enforcement failed to properly preserve biological evi-
dence from the crime scene.21 Twelve years later, DNA tech-
nology had improved enough that the very evidence that had
been degraded through law enforcement’s negligence was now
testable. The DNA tests exonerated Youngblood and matched
another man.  The State of Arizona spent more than $109,000
to keep him behind bars for six and a half years, while the true
perpetrator remained free. The DNA test that freed him cost
$32.22
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BETTER JUDGING INNOCENCE
The truth is humbling.  These DNA exonerees’ cases looked
strong at the time.  Many of us would have convicted these
defendants had we been the jurors.  Yet judges are uniquely
positioned to prevent evidence from contamination that may
make the weak appear strong and allowing fiction to replace
truth.  Social science research may increasingly help to identify
ways to improve the accuracy of evidence at criminal trials.23
Rulings like those from the New Jersey Supreme Court and the
Oregon Supreme Court, and state legislation and efforts at the
local level to improve the accuracy of evidence collected early
on in criminal investigations, may prevent the tragic miscar-
riage of justice in our courtrooms. 
DNA testing cannot be used in the vast majority of criminal
cases.  These 250 exonerations (now there have been more
than 300 such DNA exonerations) are just the tip of a larger
iceberg.  However, we do not know which seemingly innocu-
ous routine cases today will be proven false tomorrow.  The
DNA exonerees’ cases provide a set of cautionary tales:  we
need to more rigorously screen the evidence and adopt more
accurate and better-documented investigative procedures.  If
evidence is contaminated very early in an investigation, it may
be impossible to undo the damage at trial or postconviction.
Unless judges take on a more active role as gatekeepers to
insist on improved practices, however, the same contaminated
confessions, suggestive eyewitness misidentifications, flawed
forensics, and false informant testimony will continue to cause
wrongful convictions.  
Upon vacating convictions, trial judges have often offered
the newly exonerated an apology.  In James Waller’s case, the
judge said: “On behalf of any and all public officials at that
time, I want to apologize.”24 Nobody can give back to these
people the years they lost.  But what we can do is work hard to
make sure that it does not happen again.
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Development of DNA-testing technology has helpedexculpate innocent defendants.1 Between 1989 and2003, many of the 74 American prisoners sentenced to
death were exonerated thanks to DNA evidence.2 For instance,
in cases where the identity of the perpetrator was the key, DNA
evidence can be of “central importance,” especially when it is
the only forensic evidence available.3 However, exculpation of
innocent defendants does not provide a satisfactory rationale
when the question is whether it is constitutional for govern-
ments to require DNA tests on all defendants arrested and
charged with a felony. 
Currently, some state statutes require DNA tests on all
felony arrestees. For example, California’s DNA and Forensic
Identification Data Base and Data Bank Act (hereinafter
“California DNA Act”) requires that DNA samples be taken
from all adults arrested for or charged with any felony offense
“immediately following arrest, or during the booking . . .
process or as soon as administratively practicable after arrest.”4
The statute was enacted out of “critical and urgent need . . . for
accurately and expeditiously identifying, apprehending, arrest-
ing, and convicting criminal offenders and exonerating per-
sons wrongly suspected or accused of crime.”5 Once officers
collect the DNA sample pursuant to the statute, it is sent to a
state laboratory.6 The laboratory then creates a DNA profile of
the arrestee solely for identification purposes.7 It analyzes thir-
teen genetic markers known as “junk DNA,” which are non-
genetic stretches of the DNA that are not linked to any known
genetic traits.8 After the analysis using “short tandem repeat”
technology, it creates a unique profile that law enforcement
uses for identification.9 The laboratory then uploads the DNA
profile into the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), a
nationwide collection of federal, state, and local DNA pro-
files.10 Once an arrestee’s DNA profile is uploaded into CODIS,
it is compared with the DNA samples collected from crime
scenes.11 The statute provides some protection against misuse
of the information obtained from the tests.12 For example, only
law-enforcement officials may access a DNA profile, and they
may not use the DNA for purposes other than to identify crim-
inal suspects.13 Moreover, state law punishes unauthorized
access or disclosure of DNA information by up to a year in
prison and a fine of up to $50,000,14 and a DNA record may
not be permanent and can be expunged under certain circum-
stances.15
There is a federal statute that is largely identical to the
California statute. The DNA Fingerprint Act, amended in 2005
and 2006, allows the Attorney General to “collect DNA sam-
ples from individuals who are arrested, facing charges” of a
federal felony.16 There are also other state laws that require
DNA testing on all defendants arrested for and charged with a
felony. For example, the Maryland DNA Collection Act
requires the government to collect the DNA samples of people
who are charged with felony burglary.17
Using California’s DNA Act as the model statute, this article
will examine whether it is constitutional to require pretrial
DNA testing on all felony arrestees under the Fourth
Amendment as well as other parts of the Constitution, specifi-
cally the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination;
the Sixth Amendment provision for effective assistance of
counsel; substantive and procedural due process; and equal
protection. The analysis will apply equally to federal and state
courts, because all of these parts of the Constitution apply to
states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.18
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I. FOURTH AMENDMENT 
The Fourth Amendment requires that all searches and
seizures be reasonable.19 Mandatory DNA testing constitutes a
search under the Fourth Amendment.20 It is settled law that
the DNA-indexing statutes authorize both a physical intrusion
to obtain a tissue sample and a chemical analysis to obtain pri-
vate physiological information about a person and therefore
are subject to the Fourth Amendment.21
Generally, a valid search under the Fourth Amendment
requires a warrant issued upon probable cause.22 However a
warrantless search can be reasonable even without probable
cause or any individualized suspicion.23 In determining
whether a warrantless DNA search is reasonable, federal courts
have used either the totality-of-the-circumstances test or the
special-needs doctrine.24
A. TOTALITY-OF-THE-CIRCUMSTANCES TEST VS. 
SPECIAL-NEEDS DOCTRINE 
Under the totality-of-the-circumstances test, determining
whether a search is reasonable involves balancing the degree of
intrusion upon an individual’s privacy and “‘the degree to
which [the search] is needed for the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests.’”25 Similarly, the special-needs doc-
trine involves balancing the individual’s privacy expectations
against the government’s interests.26 The difference between
the two tests is the degree of importance that the governmen-
tal interest carries. The totality-of-the-circumstances test does
not require as strong an interest as the special-needs doctrine
does.27 Therefore, if requiring DNA testing for all people
charged with a felony is to be constitutional under the Fourth
Amendment regardless of which test a court uses, it must sat-
isfy the special-needs doctrine. 
B. APPLICATION OF THE TOTALITY-OF-THE-CIRCUM-
STANCES TEST 
Under the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, courts
are likely to allow governments to mandate DNA tests on all
people arrested and charged with a felony. Balancing the
intrusion on the arrestee’s privacy interests against the gov-
ernment’s interest in collecting and testing his DNA, courts
have held that conducting pretrial DNA testing on felony
arrestees does not violate the
Fourth Amendment.28
First, the privacy intrusion
involves invasion of bodily
integrity and revelation of personal
identity.29 With regard to bodily
intrusion, courts are likely to hold
that intrusion on bodily integrity is
minimal. For example, in Haskell v.
Harris, the Ninth Circuit held that
a buccal swab—a common method
for collecting DNA samples—is a
“de minimis” invasion because it gently sweeps along an
arrestee’s inner cheek.30 Similarly, the Third Circuit held that
the act of collecting a DNA sample is “‘neither a significant
nor an unusual intrusion.’”31 The court noted that the U.S.
Supreme Court has held that blood tests using venipuncture
“‘do not constitute an unduly extensive imposition on an indi-
vidual’s personal privacy and bodily integrity.’”32 It further
explained that the FBI’s current method of collecting a blood
sample involves a finger prick, which is a far less invasive pro-
cedure than venipuncture.33 The court held that this method,
as well as the buccal swab, are both “minimal” and are not sig-
nificant or unusual intrusions.34
Regarding the second type of privacy invasion—revelation
of identity and other personal information—defendants also
face a difficult task. Although arrestees have a greater expecta-
tion of privacy than convicted defendants, they are “not enti-
tled to the full panoply of rights and protections possessed by
the general public.”35 Such diminished expectations of privacy
are justified by the probable-cause finding, which is necessary
for a valid arrest.36 Therefore, arrestees have diminished pri-
vacy interests in their identity.37 Moreover, profiles collected
from DNA testing and entered into CODIS reveal only identity
and no other significant personal information, such as familial
lineage, predisposition to genetic conditions and diseases, or
genetic markers for traits such as aggression, sexual orienta-
tion, substance addiction, and criminal tendencies.38
Therefore, it is not likely that arrestee defendants can success-
fully claim misuse of DNA information in a way that violates
their privacy interests.    
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Compared to this minimal
privacy intrusion, courts have
held that the government’s
compelling interests in con-
ducting DNA tests outweigh
the privacy invasion.39 Such
compelling interests include
promoting increased accuracy
in the investigation and prose-
cution of criminal cases, which
involves identifying arrestees;
solving past crimes; preventing
future crimes; and exonerating the innocent.40 Particularly,
DNA testing is a better and more accurate source of identifica-
tion than fingerprinting—perpetrators can easily hide their
fingerprints by wearing gloves, but they cannot mask their
DNA.41 Moreover, DNA testing will help reduce recidivism
because if a felony arrestee knows that his DNA is in the gov-
ernment’s database, he is less likely to commit another crime.42
In sum, cases suggest that governmental interests outweigh
the minimal degree of privacy intrusion from DNA testing.
Therefore, mandatory pretrial DNA tests are likely to be
upheld under the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.
Nevertheless, further analysis is needed under the special-
needs doctrine, which applies stricter standards in reviewing
governmental interests. 
C. APPLICATION OF THE SPECIAL-NEEDS DOCTRINE 
Under the special-needs doctrine, an otherwise invalid war-
rantless search under the Fourth Amendment is reasonable if it
serves special governmental needs, beyond the normal need
for law enforcement.43 In determining whether there are spe-
cial government needs, it is necessary to balance the individ-
ual’s privacy expectations against the government’s interests.44
If balancing the two factors leads to the conclusion that it is
impractical to require a warrant or some level of individualized
suspicion in the particular context, the warrantless search is
considered reasonable.45
In Green v. Berge,46 the Seventh Circuit reviewed the spec-
trum of privacy interests that must be analyzed under the
Fourth Amendment. At one end is the privacy interest of an
unsuspected person not under any custody, whose interests
receive the highest protection.47 At the other end are the
diminished privacy expectations of incarcerated felons.48
Given this spectrum, the question is: On which side of the
spectrum does the privacy interest of a person arrested and
charged with a felony fall? One recent case suggests that pri-
vacy expectations of such people are likely to be on the lower
side of the spectrum. 
In United States v. Thomas,49 the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of New York considered a federal statute that
authorized the government to subject people charged with fed-
eral crimes to DNA tests. The court held that the privacy intru-
sion was “‘quite small’” due to the defendant’s status as an
indictee.50 Regardless of whether a person is under pretrial
detention, “‘when a suspect is arrested upon probable cause, his
identification becomes a matter of legitimate state interest and
he can hardly claim privacy in it.’”51 On the other hand, the
government had a compelling interest in rapidly solving crimes
by maintaining DNA records of arrestees’ identities.52 Thus, the
court upheld the federal statute because the governmental
interests outweighed the minimal degree of privacy invasion.53
It should be noted that Thomas suggests that governmental
interests outweigh an indictee’s privacy interests, regardless of
whether the indictee is in pretrial custody or not. This logic of
the court is proper for several reasons. First, because all
indictees are treated the same regardless of whether they are in
pretrial custody, the results of the anaylsis do not hinge on
unfortunate happenstances. In other words, if the court came
to different conclusions based on the assumption that detained
indictees and undetained indictees have different privacy inter-
ests, results would depend on one’s lawyer being competent
enough to argue for pretrial release or perhaps on the arbi-
trariness of the judge at a bond hearing. Second, the logic not
only promotes the government’s interest of expedited disposi-
tion of cases but also furthers the defendant’s interest in a
speedy trial.  
In determining whether a defendant’s Sixth Amendment
speedy-trial rights are violated, one of the balancing factors is
whether the defendant is prejudiced by the delay of trial.54 A
defendant is deemed to be prejudiced by delay if he will suffer
oppressive pretrial incarceration with accompanying idleness,
loss of a job, and disruption of family life.55 Moreover, even if
the defendant is not under any pretrial custody or if he is
released under bail, he will have to suffer anxiety, suspicion,
and hostility also recognized in Sixth Amendment analysis.56
This suggests that courts are concerned with the impact of Sixth
Amendment violations on the private life of the defendant. 
In a similar vein, the purpose of the Fourth Amendment
is to protect the privacy and security of citizens.57 The Fourth
Amendment applies to searches conducted after a person is
charged with a crime, just as the Sixth Amendments applies to
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people charged with a crime. Therefore, Fourth Amendment
analysis must not be blind to the concerns embraced under
Sixth Amendment analysis. That is, Fourth Amendment
analysis should consider factors including the defendant’s loss
of freedom caused by pretrial custody, or, if the defendant is
not under custody, the anxiety, suspicion, and hostility that he
suffers. 
This framework suggests that courts’ decisions upholding
mandatory pretrial DNA testing protect defendants from
unwarranted intrusions on privacy. By expeditiously finding
out the identity of the felon and confirming that the defendant
is not the perpetrator, the government can protect the defen-
dant from loss of liberty caused by pretrial incarceration or, if
the defendant is not under pretrial custody, can protect the
defendant from further suspicion, anxiety, and hostility. 
II. FIFTH AMENDMENT
Under the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimina-
tion, a person must not “‘be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself.’”58 If the prosecution obtains
statements from the defendant (either exculpatory or inculpa-
tory) through custodial interrogation initiated by the police
without informing him of the procedural safeguards to protect
his privilege against self-incrimination, the prosecution may
not use such statements against the defendant once the legal
proceeding begins.59 The requirement of DNA testing raises a
Fifth Amendment issue because the testing does not involve
any prior Miranda warnings, such as a person being informed
that he has “the right to remain silent, that anything he says
can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right
to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an
attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any question-
ing if he so desires.”60
A. CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION
The threshold question would be whether “custodial inter-
rogation” takes place when the government conducts DNA
testing. First, a suspect is under “custody” when there is “‘a
“formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement” of the
degree associated with a formal arrest.’”61 Incarceration of any
form satisfies this test.62 On the other hand, a temporary and
relatively nonthreatening detention, such as a traffic stop or
Terry stop,63 does not constitute Miranda custody.64 Under
the statute mandating DNA tests on all felony arrestees, the
DNA test must be done “immediately following arrest, or dur-
ing the booking.”65 In other words, DNA tests are likely to be
done while the defendant is under pretrial custody.  
B. TESTIMONIAL OR COM-
MUNICATIVE EVIDENCE 
Assuming that DNA testing
is done when a person is under
custody, the next question is
whether an interrogation took
place. Interrogation encom-
passes express questioning, as
well as any words or actions on the part of the police (other
than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the
police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incrimi-
nating response from the suspect.66 DNA testing is not likely to
involve express questioning. It would rather involve actions in
an attempt to obtain identification information—which may,
in effect, be incriminating. In that sense, DNA testing can be
regarded as interrogation.
However, regardless of whether there is custodial interroga-
tion, it is important to note that the right against self-incrimi-
nation applies only to testimonial or communicative evidence.
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has not provided a clear test
as to what constitutes “testimony.”67 Yet, the court has noted
that “‘[i]t is the “extortion of information from the accused,”
the attempt to force him “to disclose the contents of his own
mind,” that implicates the Self-Incrimination Clause.’”68 This
suggests, first, that the court defines “testimony” as substan-
tive cognition—the product of cognition that results in hold-
ing or asserting propositions with truth-value,69 and second,
that the state must cause this cognition for the Fifth
Amendment to be implicated.70 In sum, the government may
not compel defendants to reveal incriminating substantive
results of cognition caused by the government.71
The question then becomes whether the results of DNA
testing constitute testimony. The answer is likely to be no,
because the tests involve examination of physiological fea-
tures, and such features cannot be altered by change in the
examinee’s cognition or perception. Therefore, even if DNA
testing is compelled by the government, analysis under the
right against self-incrimination is likely to be implausible.
III. SIXTH AMENDMENT 
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel includes the right to
effective assistance of counsel.72 The right to effective assis-
tance of counsel is recognized not for its own sake but
because of the effect it has on the ability of the accused to
receive a fair trial.73
The right to effective assistance of counsel is violated when
the accused is not able to receive a fair trial because the chal-
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lenged conduct has affected the
reliability of the trial process.74
A trial is unfair if the accused is
denied counsel at a “critical
stage” of his trial.75 At such a
critical stage, the government
violates the accused’s right to
counsel if it “interferes in certain
ways with the ability of coun-
sel to make independent deci-
sions about how to conduct the
defense.”76
A. SIXTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS OF THE CUR-
RENT STATUTE 
California’s current DNA statute mandates all felony
arrestees to be subject to DNA tests. In other words, even if
an arrestee is afforded an attorney, counsel cannot advise the
client as to whether he should subject himself to a DNA test.
Considering that the results of the DNA test may yield incul-
pating evidence, the government essentially prevents the
defense counsel from making independent decisions about
how to conduct the defense. As a result, a felony arrestee is
not afforded effective assistance of counsel during the pretrial
phase. Therefore, the important question would be whether
the deprivation of the right to effective assistance of counsel
takes place at a critical stage of the trial. If so, the government
would be violating the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. 
B. CRITICAL STAGE OF TRIAL 
Critical stages of trial include any stage of the prosecution,
formal or informal, in or out of court, where counsel’s absence
might detract from the accused’s right to a fair trial.77 The
scope of critical stages reaches pretrial phases because the pres-
ence of counsel at critical confrontations, such as at the trial
itself, assures that the accused’s interests will be protected in a
manner consistent with our adversary theory of criminal pros-
ecution.78
Such critical stages are distinguished from a “mere prepara-
tory step” at which no right to counsel is guaranteed.79 The
Constitution does not guarantee the right to assistance of
counsel in the prosecution’s preparatory step of gathering evi-
dence.80 This includes the government’s systematized or scien-
tific analyzing of the accused’s fingerprints, blood sample,
clothing, and hair.81 The rationale is that knowledge of rele-
vant scientific and technological techniques is sufficiently
available, and there are few variables in techniques.82
Therefore, the accused has an opportunity for a meaningful
confrontation with the government’s case at trial through
cross-examination of the government’s expert witnesses and
the presentation of evidence from his own experts.83
This may at first glance suggest that the process of DNA
testing falls under the mere preparatory step of gathering evi-
dence. However, the Court was careful to note that the ratio-
nale behind this distinction is that the accused has the oppor-
tunity to meaningfully challenge the government’s case at trial.
Therefore, to determine whether the mandated DNA test con-
stitutes a critical stage or a mere preparatory step, the critical
question is whether the defendant has an opportunity to mean-
ingfully confront the government’s DNA evidence. The answer
to the question is that there is no such opportunity. 
For a defendant to have a fair trial, the government’s DNA
analysis should be challenged. The results of DNA tests may be
biased because DNA experts have intimate connections with
the laboratories and financial interests in the DNA tests.84
Sometimes the experts’ careers hinge on the success of the tests
and the admissibility of test results.85 Almost all crime labora-
tories are connected to law-enforcement agencies, which raises
the risk that laboratories will be subject to police and prosecu-
tor interests in obtaining convictions rather than pursuing
objective truth.86 Nevertheless, there is no opportunity for the
defendant to meaningfully challenge the government’s DNA
evidence at trial for several reasons. 
First, a defense counsel may lack the scientific knowledge
required to meaningfully examine the accuracy of the DNA
evidence. To clearly explain to the jury what the DNA evi-
dence shows, the defense counsel should know how to pre-
sent the evidence and identify and refute the prosecutor’s fail-
ings.87 However, defense counsel may not be familiar with
specific scientific theories that are at issue in a case and may
therefore be unable to provide the detailed analysis that an
appointed expert might provide.88 Moreover, defense coun-
sel cannot testify in front of the jury.89 Therefore, the only
remedy would be to question the prosecution’s expert, who is
unlikely to give testimony unfavorable to himself or his
processes.90
Second, the statute affects the ability of indigent defendants
to put forth a meaningful defense in jurisdictions where courts
do not appoint independent experts for indigent defendants. In
some jurisdictions, an indigent defendant has no such right to
appointment of an independent expert on the grounds that
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DNA experts can do no more than passively inform or educate
a defense attorney.91 Because uncertainties and ambiguities
may affect any DNA test, relying on one expert carries a sig-
nificant risk that a jury will misunderstand or inaccurately
evaluate the meaning or significance of DNA evidence.92
Experts present the results of a DNA test in “stark, black-and-
white terms that do not fully reflect the potential problems that
can affect any test.”93 A jury is often simply informed that two
samples match and that the match has a certain statistical sig-
nificance.94 Moreover, “an expert who exaggerates the signifi-
cance of a declared match is not likely to explain how this sig-
nificance is exaggerated.”95 As a result, the absence of an inde-
pendent analysis of the DNA sample will diminish the reliabil-
ity of the results of the trial.  
In sum, a felony arrestee will not have an opportunity to
meaningfully confront the government’s evidence at trial.
Thus, the moment at which he is subject to DNA test before
trial is a critical stage of trial, rather than a mere preparatory
step. Therefore, because the statute automatically requires
DNA testing on all felony arrestees without any consultation
with their counsels, the statute violates the defendant’s right to
assistance of counsel. 
IV. DUE PROCESS    
In Graham v. Connor, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
when “the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual
source of constitutional protection. . . , that Amendment, not
the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due process’” gov-
erns the analysis.96 However, nine years later in County of
Sacramento v. Lewis,97 the court held that this holding in
Graham does not bar the court from reaching the due-process
question.98 The court held that “‘if a constitutional claim is
covered by a specific constitutional provision, such as the
Fourth . . . Amendment, the claim must be analyzed under the
standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the
rubric of substantive due process.’”99 Therefore, if a claim
involves “searches and seizures” covered by the Fourth
Amendment, a due-process analysis is not appropriate.100
However, the court cautioned that its holding applies only to
executive actions as opposed to legislative enactments.101 That
is, if an executive act is at issue and is covered by the Fourth
Amendment, due-process analysis does not apply.102 An exec-
utive act in violation of the
Fourth Amendment would con-
stitute a due-process violation
only if it is “arbitrary” and
“shocking to the conscience.”103
On the other hand, if a legisla-
tive enactment at issue, due-
process analysis may apply.104
The rationale behind the execu-
tive-act-versus-legislative-enactment distinction is that sub-
stantive due process is most apt when invoked to protect indi-
vidual rights against systematic governmental invasion.105
Under the framework set forth in County of Sacramento v.
Lewis, a DNA statute mandating DNA tests on all people
charged with felonies will be subject to due-process analysis if
it is legislative enactment. The statute mandating DNA tests is
undoubtedly a legislative enactment and therefore would not
preclude substantive due-process analysis.
A. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS  
The Due Process Clause protects fundamental rights and
liberties that are “deeply rooted in this nation’s history and tra-
dition.”106 It “‘forbids the government to infringe . . . “funda-
mental” liberty interests at all, no matter what process is
provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling state interest.’”107
Defendants might claim that liberty interests are affected
either at pretrial stages or at trial. The pretrial rights affected at
trial are privacy interests and the right not to offer inculpatory
evidence. On the other hand, the right implicated at trial is the
right to a fair trial.    
1. Pretrial rights affected: Privacy interests and the
right not to offer inculpatory evidence
Pretrial DNA testing involves an invasion of privacy because
DNA sampling involves physical intrusion.108 Privacy interests
are protected as liberty interests under the Due Process
Clause.109 Concerning the development of DNA-testing tech-
nology and its accuracy, mandatory DNA tests may be inculpa-
tory evidence. The defendant, however, has no duty to offer
such inculpatory evidence.110 The Due Process Clause places
the burden on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable
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doubt all of the elements of
the charged offense.111
Therefore, a defendant has
no duty to disclose whatever
inculpatory evidence he
discovers.112 Because such
liberty interests are pro-
tected under the Due
Process Clause, the govern-
ment is depriving the defendants of those interests through pre-
trial DNA testing. The next question, then, is whether there is
a compelling government interest for mandating pretrial DNA
testing, and whether DNA testing is narrowly tailored to that
government interest. 
There is likely to be a compelling government interest
because due process is designed to “enhance the search truth
in the criminal trial” by assuring for both the defendant and
the government ample opportunity to investigate facts that are
crucial in determining guilt or innocence.113 DNA testing is
narrowly tailored to this interest. DNA evidence has a high
degree of accuracy in demonstrating a connection between evi-
dence and a specific individual or source.114 For instance, in a
murder case where the identity of the perpetrator is the key,
DNA evidence can be critical, especially when it is the only
forensic evidence available.115
In sum, privacy interests and the right not to offer inculpa-
tory evidence are outweighed by the government interests.
However, as demonstrated below, the result of applying the
due-process balancing test is different for the defendant’s right
to a fair trial.  
2. Rights affected at trial 
a) Right to a fair trial: encompassing the right to an
independent expert 
A fair trial is a central constitutional goal.116 Part of what
guarantees a fair trial is a defendant’s right under the Sixth
Amendment to confront witnesses as well as the right of com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in defendant’s favor.117
The Due Process Clause protects both as fundamental rights
essential to a fair trial.118
Under the Sixth Amendment, an accused can have a mean-
ingful confrontation of the State’s case at trial through the ordi-
nary processes of cross-examination and the presentation of
evidence from his own experts.119 “‘[T]he Confrontation
Clause guarantees only “an opportunity for effective cross-
examination, not cross-examination that is effective in what-
ever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.”’”120
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has noted that when the 
“‘[k]nowledge of the techniques of science and tech-
nology is sufficiently available, and the variables in tech-
niques few enough, . . .  the accused has the opportu-
nity for a meaningful confrontation of the
Government’s case at trial through the ordinary
processes of cross-examination of the Government’s
expert witnesses and the presentation of the evidence
of his own experts.’”121
This suggests that even when the government’s evidence
involves science and technology, and knowledge about those
fields is widely available, a defendant’s meaningful challenge of
the government’s evidence should involve a separate expert
witness for the defendant. Moreover, given that the
Confrontation Clause guarantees an “opportunity for effective
cross-examination,” the presence of the defense’s own experts
is also a part of preparing for effective cross-examination. It
has been noted that DNA technology is complex, and thus it is
“doubtful that a defense attorney will have the requisite
knowledge to effectively examine autorads, laboratory books,
quality control tests, copies of reports by the testing labs, stan-
dard deviations, contaminants, etc., without expert assis-
tance.”122
b) Lack of an independent expert in the context of
DNA test results presented as evidence  
i) Violation of the right to fair trial 
As noted above, a DNA sample will be collected and ana-
lyzed by the government’s experts, and an indigent defendant
will have no opportunity to subject it to an analysis by an inde-
pendent expert. This deprives the defendant of his right to a
meaningful chance to confront the witness—the government’s
expert. Indeed, it might be argued that such a Confrontation
Clause violation is only harmless error. Currently all 50 states
have harmless-error statutes or rules, and the federal statute
also provides that courts’ “judgments shall not be reversed for
‘errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of
the parties.’”123 Under the harmless-error rule, not all federal
constitutional errors are automatically deemed harmful.
However, Confrontation Clause errors are subject to harmless-
error analysis.124 Moreover, Confrontation Clause violations
will almost always constitute harmful errors.  
First, there may be problems in a particular case with how
the DNA was collected, examined in the laboratory, or inter-
111.Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977).
112.Turkish, 623 F.2d at 774.
113.Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 82 (1970).
114.NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN
THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD S-5, 3-2 (2009),
http://ag.ca.gov/meetings/tf/pdf/2009_NAS_report.pdf.
115.See House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 540 (2006).
116.Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965).
117.Pointer, 380 U.S. at 403, 405; Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S.
39, 45 n.5 (1987).
118.Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 45 n.5; Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17-
18 (1967).
119.See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 267 (1967).
120.United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 559 (1988) (quoting
Kentucky V. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739 (1987)).
121.United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 315 (1973) (quoting Wade,
388 U.S. at 227-28).
122.Dubose, 662 So.2d at 1196.
123.Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21-22 (1967) (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 2111).
124.Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986).
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preted, including mixed samples, limited amounts of DNA,
or biases due to the statistical interpretation of data from par-
tial profiles.125 Whether such contaminating factors are
involved can be best explained by an independent expert.
Although a lawyer is given an opportunity for cross-exami-
nation, he may not have a meaningful opportunity to cross-
examine the witnesses because of the intricacies of the tech-
nology involved.126
Second, without an expert of his own, the defendant will be
subject to an unfair trial because of the powerful impact of sci-
entific evidence presented by the government. Surveys of
summoned jurors in Michigan gauged their attitudes toward
scientific evidence. Jurors generally had high expectations
that they would be presented with scientific evidence.127
Moreover, jurors thought that DNA and other modern scien-
tific techniques were extremely accurate.128 Jurors viewed
DNA evidence to have a “‘special aura of credibility.’”129 One
study found that jurors rated DNA evidence as 95% accu-
rate.130
Therefore, by producing inculpatory evidence for the gov-
ernment without an analysis from an independent expert of his
own, the defendant will be subject to an unfair trial. The next
question then is whether there are compelling governmental
interests and whether pretrial DNA tests are narrowly tailored
to those interests. 
ii) Balancing against governmental interests
The government’s interest is identical to the defendant’s
interest—the search for truth, which can happen only through
allowing meaningful examination of the facts by both the pros-
ecution and the defendant.131 The Supreme Court has noted
that discovery in search for truth must be a “two-way
street.”132 Viewed in this manner, the balancing factors all go
against mandatory pretrial DNA testing. 
Moreover, such a conclusion is supported by the principle
underlying due process. If there is a “reasonable probability”
that prosecutorial argument undermines confidence in the
outcome, the defendant’s substantive due-process rights are
violated.133 If powerful scientific evidence is persuading the
fact-finders, and if the defense does not have an independent
expert to challenge it, there is a reasonable probability that the
prosecution’s DNA evidence will change the outcome—that is,
to convict a defendant who would otherwise not be convicted.
Therefore, the statute would result in a violation of the defen-
dant’s due-process right to a fair trial.  
B. PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS
Even if a substantive due-
process argument may not be
viable, the defendant may still
bring his claim under proce-
dural due process. Procedural
due process involves a two-
step analysis: (1) Did the
individual possess interests
protected under the Due
Process Clause? (2) Was the
individual afforded an appropriate level of process?134
1. Does the defendant arrested and charged with a
felony possess interests protected under the Due
Process Clause? 
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, a government may not “‘deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law.’”135 The
Due Process Clause protects an individual’s property and lib-
erty interests.136 In the context of DNA testing, the question is
whether the government violates any liberty interests of the
person arrested and charged with a felony when it compels
pretrial DNA testing. 
There are two conceivable claims regarding a liberty-inter-
est violation. First, pretrial DNA testing involves a privacy
invasion because DNA sampling involves physical intrusion.137
Second, mandatory DNA testing may violate the defendant’s
right not to offer inculpatory evidence.138 Even assuming that
these interests are protected under the Due Process Clause, the
question remains whether the defendant is afforded due
process—that is, an appropriate level of process. 
2. Was the individual afforded an appropriate level
of process?
If a government requires all defendants charged with a
felony to undergo DNA tests, the government is apparently not
affording the defendants with an evidentiary hearing of any
type before collecting DNA samples from them. Then the ques-
tion is whether providing for such a hearing still satisfies pro-
cedural due process.  Due process is a flexible concept that
calls for procedural protections as each particular situation
demands.139 This flexibility is “necessary to gear the process to
the particular need,” and therefore what process is due
125.NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 114, at 3-12. 
126.See Dubose, 662 So.2d at 1197.
127.Hon. Donald E. Shelton, Juror Expectations for Scientific Evidence
in Criminal Cases: Perceptions and Reality about the “CSI Effect”
Myth, 27 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 1, 5, 10 (2010).
128.Hon. Donald E. Shelton, Twenty-First Century Forensic Science
Challenges for Trial Judges in Criminal Cases: Where the
“Polybutadiene” Meets the “Bitumen,” 18 WIDENER L.J. 309, 377-
78 (2009).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131.Williams, 399 U.S. at 82.
132.Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 475 (1973).
133.See Romine v. Head, 253 F.3d 1349, 1366 (11th Cir. 2001).
134.Ward v. Anderson, 494 F.3d 929, 934 (10th Cir. 2007).
135.Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147 (1968).
136.Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571-72
(1972).
137.Amerson, 483 F.3d at 84.
138.Turkish, 623 F.2d at 774.
139.Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S.
1, 12 (1979) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481
(1972)).
Court Review - Volume 48 145
Even if a 
substantive due-
process argument
may not be viable,
the defendant may
still bring his claim
under procedural
due process.
depends on the need to minimize
the risk of error.140 To determine
whether procedural due process
is satisfied, courts must consider:
“‘(1) the nature of the private
interest at stake, . . . (2) the value
of the additional safeguard, and
(3) the adverse impact of the
requirement upon the govern-
ment’s interests.’”141 With regard
to the first factor—the nature of
the private interest at stake—
courts look into the degree to which the defendant is entitled
to such interest.142 For example, a prisoner has only  limited
privacy interests. With regard to the second factor—the value
of the additional safeguard—the defendant must explain the
purpose that will be served by pre-deprivation hearings or
other processes.143
Under the framework, the first factor—nature of the pri-
vate interest at stake—may be critical, as it would be the case
with the right to fair trial. Nevertheless, the two remaining
factors weigh against providing for a pre-deprivation hearing.
First, the government has a compelling interest in seeking the
truth in a criminal trial through identifying the defendant.144
Moreover, pre-deprivation hearings or other additional safe-
guards are likely to serve that purpose. In Wilson v. Collins, the
Sixth Circuit discussed a statute requiring collection of DNA
samples from convicted felons. The court held that the lack of
a pre-deprivation hearing does not violate procedural due
process because the only criterion at the pre-deprivation hear-
ing would be the conviction for a predicate offense.145
Similarly, in a pre-deprivation hearing for a pretrial DNA test,
the only criterion is whether the defendant is arrested or
charged with a felony. Therefore, a pre-deprivation hearing
would serve little purpose for the defendant arrested or
charged with a felony. Lack of a pre-deprivation hearing for a
pretrial DNA testing is unlikely to violate procedural due
process.
V. EQUAL PROTECTION 
Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, a government must not “‘deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.’”146 Essentially, all people similarly situated should
be treated alike.147 Therefore, a government violates the
Equal Protection Clause if it makes a classification in a way
that affects similarly situated groups in an unequal man-
ner.148 In the context of the DNA statute, the statute makes a
classification between people arrested for or charged with
felonies and people arrested for or charged with misde-
meanors. The question is whether those two groups of peo-
ple are similarly situated. 
Caselaw suggests that people convicted of felonies or con-
victed of misdemeanors are not similarly situated.149 A felon is
uniquely burdened by diverse statutorily imposed disabilities
long after his release from prison.150 On the other hand, when
misdemeanants conclude their sentences, they have no further
obligations nor loss of civil rights.151 Moreover, it is the leg-
islative function to draw a line between what classifies as a
felony or a misdemeanor.152 Courts are not in the position to
weigh the gravity of different criminal offenses and assess what
commensurate action should be taken.153
Likewise, people arrested for and charged with felonies and
people arrested for and charged with misdemeanors would
respectively be facing different obligations and risks of loss of
civil rights. Therefore, a facial equal-protection challenge to
the DNA statute is likely to be foreclosed because people
charged with felonies and those accused of misdemeanors are
not similarly situated. Nevertheless, a defendant may turn to a
disparate-impact analysis.  
Under the disparate-impact analysis, a statute otherwise
neutral on its face must not be applied to invidiously discrim-
inate an identifiable group.154 Felony arrestees or indictees
might claim that the facially non-discriminatory DNA statute
has a disproportionate impact on, for example, racial minori-
ties.155 However, a disparate impact upon an identifiable
group, while relevant, is not dispositive of whether a statute
violates the Equal Protection Clause. Unless the disparate
impact is traced to a discriminatory purpose, it may not sup-
port an equal-protection claim.156 Therefore, unless there are
facts connecting the disparate impact to any discriminatory
intent on the part of the government, people arrested for or
charged with felonies are not likely to persuade the court on
their disparate-impact claims. 
CONCLUSION
Current federal statutes and several state statutes require
DNA testing on all felony arrestees and indictees. Beyond con-
cerns about privacy of the defendants and the governmental
interests of solving crimes, there are more profound concerns
140.Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 13.  
141.Wade v. Brady, 460 F.Supp.2d 226, 246 (D. Mass. 2006) (quoting
United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 631 (2002)).
142 See Wilson v. Collins, 517 F.3d 421, 430-31 (6th Cir. 2008).
143.See Wilson, 517 F.3d at 430. 
144.Williams, 399 U.S. at 82; Haskell v. Brown, 677 F.Supp.2d 1187,
1199 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
145.Wilson v. Collins, 517 F.3d 421, 430 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Rise
v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1562-63 (9th Cir.1995)).
146.Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976).
147.Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439.
148.People v. Travis, 139 Cal.App.4th 1271, 1291 (Cal. Ct. App.
2006).  
149. Id, at 1292.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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154.Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976); Johnson v. State,
965 So.2d 866, 872 (1st Cir. 2007).
155. Johnson v. Quander, 370 F.Supp.2d 79, 93 (D.D.C. 2005).
156. Johnson, 965 So.2d at 872; see Johnson, 370 F.Supp.2d at 94.
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behind the statutes. Results of DNA tests can be tainted when
laboratories are situated within law-enforcement agencies.
Defense counsel may not be able to effectively tackle such
tainted results when they are not sufficiently knowledgeable
about the complex DNA science. Particularly, when an indi-
gent defendant is not appointed an independent witness, his
counsel may provide ineffective assistance at trial.
Consequently, the DNA statutes result in depriving the defen-
dant of the opportunity to meaningfully challenge the govern-
ment’s case at trial. That is, the effect of the DNA statutes
reaches the criminal defendant’s trial in the courtrooms.
Because of concern that the DNA statutes violate the defen-
dant’s constitutional rights under substantive due process and
the right to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth
Amendment, the constitutionality of such statutes should be
re-evaluated.  
Sang Jee Park is a 2012 graduate of the
University of Iowa College of Law. She previ-
ously obtained a B.A. in international studies
from Ewha Women’s University in Seoul, South
Korea, in 2009. Ms. Park is presently working
as a legal intern at the office of New York City
Council Member G. Oliver Koppell; she recently
passed the New York bar exam. Ms. Park won
first place in the American Judges Association’s 2012 essay contest
for law students with the paper that became this article.
Court Review - Volume 48 147
A
NEW PUBLICATIONS
New Papers in the
Perspectives in 
State Court Leadership Series
http://goo.gl/D3lbd 
The Harvard Kennedy School of
Government has sponsored a series of
“Executive Sessions” over the years on
topics such as community policing. The
Kennedy School convened a series of
Executive Sessions for state-court leaders
from 2008 through 2011, focusing on
what leaders of state courts can and
should do in leading state courts in the
21st Century.
A series of papers is being published
online, and we’ll let you know here when
papers of particular interest are issued.
We published one of them in the last
issue of Court Review—Opinions as the
Voice of the Court: How State Supreme
Courts Can Communicate Effectively and
Promote Procedural Fairness, by Texas
Chief Justice Wallace Jefferson, former
California judicial administrator William
Vickrey, and California courts researcher
Douglas Denton. 
We think two more of the recently
published papers will be of general inter-
est to judges.
Social-media expert Garrett Graff, the
editor-in-chief for Washingtonian maga-
zine, provides his view on the signifi-
cance of the arrival of social media as it
alters the expectations and habits of
American society. He advises state-court
leaders that they “must not only learn
how to communicate with new tools;
they must also envision new means of
judicial engagement with the public
through the new social media that can
further advance the legitimacy of courts
in a democratic society.” His paper is
Courts as Conversations: An Argument for
Increased Engagement by Court Leaders.
Greg A. Rowe, a government official
who regularly handles legislative matters,
provides advice for court leaders on how
better to interact with the leaders of the
other branches of government on budget
matters. Rowe is the Chief of the
Legislation and Policy Unit for the
Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office,
and he provides 16 specific recommenda-
tions for judicial-branch leaders on deal-
ing with the other branches of govern-
ment on budget issues. He includes
advice on how to understand the political
environment, how to develop relation-
ships with key groups and individuals,
and how to create a coherent communi-
cations strategy. His paper is Keeping
Courts Funded: Recommendations on How
Courts Can Avoid the Budget Axe.
The Harvard Kennedy School of
Government and the National Center for
State Courts publish the papers. The
Bureau of Justice Assistance, the State
Justice Institute, and the National Center
for State Courts provided funding for the
Executive Sessions on court leadership.
All of the papers are available at the web-
site noted above.
o
WEB RESOURCES
Center on Court Access
to Justice for All
http://www.ncsc.org/atj
The National Center for State Courts
has established a web-based Center on
Court Access to Justice for All, which
seeks to assist judges and courts in pro-
viding better access to justice. The Center
works with a number of national organi-
zations, including the American Judges
Association, to implement realistic
access-to-justice solutions.
One key feature of the Center is a series
of “Access Briefs,” short papers on key
topics for access to justice. The first paper,
issued in November 2012, is on self-help
services (http://goo.gl/FvGvl). It’s an 11-
page paper setting out various options for
providing help to the self-represented liti-
gant, with examples of courts that have set
up useful websites, courthouse desks or
offices, telephone-based programs, in-per-
son clinics, and courtroom assistance. 
The paper is written by two staffers of
the National Center for State Courts—
Deborah Saunders, a senior knowledge
and information services analyst, and
Pamela Casey, a principal court research
consultant—along with Richard Zorza, a
long-time advocate of better resources for
the self-represented. One of the best fea-
tures of the paper, as accessed online, is
that there are four pages of endnotes fol-
lowing the paper that are chocked with
links to examples of all sorts of methods
for helping self-represented litigants as
well as key articles in this area that pro-
vide greater detail.
The Center also offers technical assis-
tance to state and local courts seeking
help in providing better access to justice.
Click the “Assistance” tab on the Center’s
home page and you’ll find a link to the
“technical assistance request form.” The
Center can provide help on topics like
simplifying forms and using plain lan-
guage, training court staff to provide
information to self-represented litigants,
and how to use pro bono attorneys to
help the self-represented.
e-Courts 2012
Conference Materials
http://www.e-courts.org
More than 500 judges, court adminis-
trators, and others attended e-Courts
2012 in Las Vegas in December. Materials
from the conference, sponsored by the
National Center for State Courts, have
been posted online. You can take a look at
the program schedule and, for most of the
programs, take a look at the PowerPoint
or other presentation materials.
For those who want an overview of
the issues involved in moving from paper
to computer for court records and func-
tions, along with the present state of the
art, these materials can be useful.
Programs at the conference included the
return on investment for switching to the
e-court model, tech tips for judges, and
ways to improve a court website.
The Resource Page
g
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